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Abstrakt 
Tato diplomová práce interpretuje post-humanismus jako filozofický směr 
zabývající se problematikou anthropocentrismu. Jejím předmětem je analýza pěti 
literárních textů (Odysseus od Jamese Joyce, Flush od Virginie Woolfové, Nightwood 
od Djuny Barnesové, Hackenfeller's Ape od Brigid Brophy a Elizabeth Costello od 
J.M. Coetzee), které nevycházejí z obecních předpokladů o tom, co je zvíře a jakou 
má funkci v kultuře a diskurzu, a tím pádem komplikují hranici mezi člověkem a 
zvířetem. Zvířata tady neslouží jako nástroj pro zobrazení lidských záležitostí a 
vlastností, ale mají svoji vlastní hodnotu a jsou pojímána nad rámec 
antropocentrických předpokladů. 
Úkolem této práce je popsat strategie, které tyto texty používají k zobrazení 
zvířat, a způsob, kterým komplikují binární opozici člověk-zvěře. Teoretický rámec 
této práce poskytují díla autorů, kteří patří k vznikajícímu oboru Animal Studies, a díla 
jiných současných filozofů, především Jacquesa Derridy, Gillese Deleuze a Felixe 
Guattari. Velkou ambicí tohoto projektu je přispět k rozvoji nové post-humanistické 
etiky, definované tendencí k inkluzi a lhostejností vůči binaritám. 
 
Klíčová slova: zvíře, Animal Studies, carno-phallogocentrismus, post-humanismus, 
James Joyce, Virginia Woolfová, Djuna Barnes, Brigid Brophy J.M. Coetzee.     
.  
Abstract  
This thesis posits post-humanism as a philosophy that engages directly with 
the problem of anthropocentrism and is concerned primarily with the metaphysics of 
subjectivity. It studies five literary texts (James Joyce’s Ulysses, Virginia Woolf’s 
Flush, Djuna Barnes’ Nightwood, Brigid Brophy’s Hackenfeller’s Ape and J.M. 
Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello: Eight Lessons) that challenge the humanistic or classical 
subject through critical engagement with what this subject traditionally saw as its 
antithesis – the animal. These texts contest various fixed assumptions about animality 
and disrupt the status-quo of the human. Breaking with the tradition that treats animals 
exclusively as a metaphor for the human, they attempt to see and understand animality 
outside the framework of anthropocentric suppositions. 
This project aims to describe the strategies these texts employ to conceptualize 
animality as well as the methods they apply to delineate its subversive potential and to 
disrupt the human-animal binary. Its theoretical framework combines the work of 
thinkers belonging to the new but thriving field of Animal Studies with the ideas of 
Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. It is this project’s great ambition 
to contribute towards the development of new post-humanist ethics defined by its 
propensity for inclusion and disregard for binaries. 
 
Keywords: animal, Animal Studies, carno-phallogocentrism, post-humanism, James 
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1. Introduction: Rethinking the Animal, Revising the 
Human 
 
Philosophy, and perhaps philosophy alone at 
this point, is able to hold open the possibility 
that thought might proceed otherwise in 
regard to animals, without the assurances of 
traditional concepts of animality and the 
human-animal distinction. What thought 
will encounter once reliance upon these 
categories is surrendered cannot be known 
in advance; however, it is certain that any 
genuine encounter with what we call 
animals will occur only from within the 
space of this surrender.  
Matthew Calarco, Zoographies  
 
This work is inspired by the tendency in philosophical thought that is 
sometimes referred to as post-humanism. However, due to the confusion that 
surrounds this term and in view of the multiple meanings it has assumed, in this 
introduction I feel first of all the need to specify what this particular project interprets 
as post-humanist. 
As the epigraph to this introduction indicates, this work is partly informed by 
the idea of surrender. It calls for the relinquishing of claims to certain rights and 
privileges that have been enjoyed by something we call “human” and is consequently 
mostly concerned with the metaphysics of subjectivity.1 It is post-humanist in the 
sense that it seeks to undermine “the self-evident status attributed to human nature as 
the common sense belief in the metaphysically stable and universal validity of the 
European humanistic subject.”2 In other words, it is concerned with what Jacques 
Derrida calls “the decentering of the subject,”3 a process predicated on the refusal to 
confine meaning to the realm of the human, which in its turn leads to rethinking of the 
ways we see and understand other forms of life. This thesis, therefore, posits post-
                                                 
1 If anything, this research is opposed to transhumanism, a branch of post-humanist theory – rather 
fashionable today – that seeks enhancement of the human through technological and other means. 
2 Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013) 6.  
3 Jacques Derrida, “‘Eating Well,’ or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jacques 
Derrida,” Who Comes after the Subject?, eds. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, Jean-Luc Nancy (New 
York; London: Routledge, 1991) 101. 
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humanism as a philosophy that engages directly with the problem of anthropocentrism 
and is linked to a certain historical moment. This historical moment is one in which 
the human subject simply can no longer afford to occupy the all-allowing position it 
has been enjoying so far, and is in need of a generative tool to help to rethink the basic 
unit of reference for the human in the bio-genetic age known as the “Anthropocene”; 
this historical moment at which the human has become a geological force capable of 
affecting all life on this planet.4   
However, although intricately connected to ecological thought, this thesis 
operates within narrower boundaries. As indicated in the title, it studies five literary 
texts that challenge the humanistic or classical subject through critical engagement 
with what this subject traditionally considered its antithesis: the animal. It aims to 
describe the strategies these texts employ to conceptualize animality as well as the 
methods they apply to delineate its subversive potential and to disrupt the human-
animal binary. It is, therefore, heavily indebted to the field of Animal Studies, a 
relatively new but thriving interdisciplinary approach to animals, their role and place 
in culture and discourse.  
So far, Animal Studies (sometimes called “human-animal” studies) does not 
have a standardized or widely accepted definition, but it is still clear that the main 
stakes of the field lie in the effort to place questions concerning animals at the center 
of critical inquiry.5 Thinkers in the field approach the problem of the animal from 
various vantage points proceeding from a wide range of disciplines within the 
humanities, social sciences, and biological and cognitive sciences,6 their common goal 
being to establish animality as a construct and to outline the ways in which the “human 
prerogative and exceptionalism might work through societies and cultures to reify the 
human being at the expense of all other beings.”7 I see this thesis as a contribution to 
the field of Animal Studies and therefore adhere to the use of pronouns that has become 
                                                 
4 Braidotti, The Posthuman, 5.  
5 Matthew Calarco, Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008) 2.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Nik Taylor and Richard Twine, “Introduction: Locating ‘Critical’ in Critical Animal Studies,” The Rise 
of Critical Animal Studies: from the Margins to the Centre, eds. Nik Taylor and Richard Twine 
(London; New York: Routledge, 2014) 6.  
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conventional among academics pursuing similar goals. When referring to animals, I 
refrain from using “it” and employ either gender-specific pronouns “he” and “she”, or, 
if the sex of the individual is unknown, the gender-neutral “they”. Furthermore, when 
in need of a relative pronoun, I refer to animals as “who” rather than “that”.  
*** 
This work argues against what Derrida criticizes as the “Cartesian fixity”8 of 
the subject and its ontological other, the animal. Foucault notes in “What is 
Enlightenment?” that “at least since the seventeenth century what is called humanism 
has always been obliged to lean on certain conceptions of man borrowed from religion, 
science, or politics. Humanism serves to color and to justify the conceptions of man to 
which it is, after all, obliged to take recourse,”9 emphasizing that for centuries Western 
metaphysical thought was focused on delineating with all possible clarity and 
distinctness a self-present, detached and autonomous human subject. In this 
delineating process, there emerged a notion of the animal as an antithesis of the human; 
according to this line of thinking, therefore, the animal should be transcended, or 
sacrificed, in order for the human to emerge.  Since “the notion of what constitutes 
animality has traditionally ben figured over and against what is supposed to constitute 
humanity,”10 the animal became everything the human did not want to be. This 
tendency is epitomized in the works of René Descartes who viewed animals as 
“biological mechanisms without any subjective awareness.”11 While many thinkers 
admitted that Descartes was taking the argument of animals’ unawareness a little too 
far, the inscription of human superiority was accomplished exactly through the 
opposition between the automatic, instinctive behavior presumably characteristic of 
all beings fitted into the category of the animal, and the autonomous self-awareness of 
the human subject.    
                                                 
8 Jacques Derrida, “And Say the Animal Responded?” Zoontologies: the Question of the Animal, ed. 
Cary Wolfe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003) 124. 
9 Michel Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?” trans. Catherine Porter, The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul 
Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984) 43–44. 
10 Calarco, Zoographies, 3. 
11 Gary Steiner, Animals and the Limits of Postmodernism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2013) 93.  
11 
 
The literary texts analyzed in this thesis contest various fixed assumptions 
about animality and disrupt the status-quo of the human. They break with the tradition 
of treating animals exclusively as “screens for the projection of human interests and 
meanings”12 or, in other words, the tradition that only ever regards animals as a 
metaphor for the human. Instead, they attempt to see and understand animals outside 
the framework of anthropocentric supposition and recognize them as carriers of 
agency and significance. This, in its turn, inevitably leads to the displacement of the 
human subject.  
This thesis considers texts written in the 20th and 21st centuries that have been 
associated with modernism and postmodernism, hence the shorthand I use in the title. 
The title, however, is not meant to indicate any serious attempt to consider, compare 
or contrast the concepts of modernity and postmodernity as such. I start with the 
analysis of three novels belonging to the modernist canon that seek to register the 
change in the literary representation of animality brought about by the modernist 
momentum towards overall aesthetic transformation. James Joyce’s Ulysses, Virginia 
Woolf’s Flush and Djuna Barnes’ Nightwood have been chosen for this analysis not 
only because animals and animality constitute an important component of the 
representational structure of these texts, but also due to the challenge they present to 
the supposed fixedness of the animal-human divide and Cartesian subjectivity. Ulysses 
provides an appropriate starting point since in spite of it being one of the most studied 
novels ever written, the reevaluation of human-animal relationships that it offers has 
largely gone unnoticed.  
The first chapter focuses on three episodes of Ulysses which interrogate the 
concept of the animal from various different perspectives. First, I consider Bloom’s 
“conversation” with the “pussens” in “Calypso” to demonstrate how the interaction 
represents an episode of “moral schizophrenia,”13 a term used by Gary Steiner to 
outline the contradiction between the assumption of moral responsibility towards 
animals that fall into the category of pets and the tendency to ignore the moral and 
ethical problems of exploiting other categories of animals. The examples of nonlexical 
                                                 
12 Philip Armstrong, What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity (London: Routledge, 2008) 2.  
13 Gary Steiner, Animals and the Limits of Postmodernism, 155. 
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onomatopoeia in the episode are considered as an attempt to stretch the 
representational limits of human language to embrace animality. Subsequently, I focus 
on “Lestrygonians” and the relationship between humans and the animals used in the 
meat industry. I use two key concepts to discuss how this relationship is construed in 
the episode; namely the concept of sacrifice as it appears in the writings of Jacques 
Derrida, and the concept of cannibalism presented in Maud Ellmann’s writings on 
animals in Ulysses that becomes entangled with the Christian sacramental rite. Lastly, 
I discuss the appearance of the dog Garryowen in “Cyclops”. I maintain that the 
episode draws attention to the problems of animal representation as it denounces the 
anthropomorphic and anthropocentric approach that literature tends to adopt towards 
animals. I argue that in “Cyclops” Garryowen is transformed into a metaphoric figure 
overloaded with multiple levels of human symbolism that adds nothing to our 
understanding of him as a dog or an animal. As he seems to transcend the ultimate 
animal-human border and acquires the ability to use language, he nevertheless remains 
confined to the realm of instincts and basic physiological needs conceptualized within 
Western thought as an animal realm. 
Joyce’s engagement with the animal question, although compelling and 
transgressive, remains sporadic with the animal enduring in the margins of the 
encyclopedic enterprise that is Ulysses. This is clearly not the case in either Flush or 
Nightwood, texts pervaded by a sense of crisis. Both novels reveal an acute awareness 
of how the old system of meaning as well as the narratives supporting it had lost 
balance and cohesion. Consequently, the novels attempt to provide new systems of 
coordinates by which humanity can navigate itself, perceiving the animal as an agency 
through which such a system can be discovered. However, the approaches that the two 
texts develop differ dramatically.  
In Flush, Woolf anthropomorphizes a dog in order to make his diverse 
experience of the world more relatable for the humans. I argue that contrary to most 
interpretations of the text, Flush the dog need not be perceived as a mere metaphor for 
the human, but as an animal with its own agency and role in the text. I discuss the 
problems that anthropomorphism poses for animal representation, but ultimately argue 
that Woolf’s use of it is not marked by the intention to simplify animality or render it 
familiar. Rather, she uses imagination and empathy as powerful tools that can provide 
13 
 
access to the world as experienced by a dog. I then proceed to discuss the link between 
the oppression of women and the oppression of animals that the text exposes only to 
reveal a more complicated network that connects the oppression active on a private 
familial level to the way that societies function on a global political level. Furthermore, 
I focus on the strategies that the text employs to picture human sensibility, predicated 
upon reason and language, as restrictive and prohibitive.  
Nightwood, although written only three years after Flush and concerned with 
similar issues, refuses to incorporate animality into the project of renewing human 
civilization. While Woolf humanizes a dog in order to make his diverse experience of 
the world accessible to humans so they can embrace this diversity and learn from it, 
Barnes animalizes her protagonist to envisage a new type of subjectivity. I read 
Nightwood as a novel that engages with the conventions of a degeneration narrative 
and uses them to denounce the very logic of progress or regress that modernist 
narratives tend to depend on. I consider Robin as the character of new post-humanist 
subjectivity as well as the many ways in which she disrupts the human-animal binary. 
I also consider Nightwood as marked by anti-Freudian discourse that resists the 
restrictions Freudianism forces onto human sexuality. In my interpretation of 
Nightwood, I rely on the critique of Freudianism offered by Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari as well as on the concept of becoming-animal outlined in their writings.  
The fourth chapter is marked by a shift towards fiction in which the animal 
question constitutes the central concern. While Ulysses, Flush and Nightwood do 
express an interest in the social and philosophical practices through which animality 
is constructed, it is still the human with which they are ultimately concerned and it is 
for the benefit of the human that they venture to undermine the meaning of animality 
in culture. Both Hackenfeller’s Ape and Elizabeth Costello, however, express interest 
in animality for its own sake, insisting that the animal question presents valid moral 
and ethical concerns.   
Hackenfeller’s Ape, by Brigid Brophy who was herself an animal rights 
advocate and a vegetarian, is concerned with the way in which people treat animals, 
as well as with the strategies that legitimize this treatment. I discuss the logic of 
speciesism as exposed in the text by focusing on zoos as places that validate and 
reinforce this logic. Furthermore, I discuss subconscious automatism and the 
14 
 
sadodispassionate scientific approach as constitutive elements in human interaction 
with animality. I also address the representational strategies that Brophy employs in 
the novel and her unconventional use of anthropomorphism to satirize the concept of 
human superiority.   
Finally, in the last chapter devoted to the third and the fourth lessons of 
Elizabeth Costello: Eight Lessons, I address the two issues of special importance to 
the text: the representation of animals in human discourse and the practice of meat-
eating as well as the intensive animal farming industry that sustains it. Here, I discuss 
the publication history of the two lessons to outline J.M. Coetzee’s understanding of 
the issues behind the very act of talking about animals, and animal representation as 
such. I employ Derrida’s concept of carno-phallogocentrism to indicate the complete 
incompatibility of the animal question with the genre of public lecture. I interpret 
Costello’s concept of “sympathetic imagination”, which provides the basis for her 
ideas on animal representation, as indebted to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of 
‘becoming’. Analyzing the reasons behind, and the rhetoric effectiveness of, 
Costello’s employment of the contentious comparison of the treatment of Jews in the 
Holocaust the treatment of animals in the food industry today, I conclude by using 
Derrida’s idea of excessive responsibility to outline the new post-humanist concept of 
responsibility introduced in the novel.  
*** 
The texts analyzed here are simultaneously the product and the repudiation of 
two massive ideological shifts that took place in the modern age and that define our 
understanding of what constitutes animality even today; namely Darwin’s theory of 
evolution and Freud’s theory of organic repression. Here, I should like to sum up the 
ways in which the two theories both revolutionized our understanding of animality and 
reinscribed previous assumptions, both undermining and reinforcing the human-
animal binary.  
The work of Charles Darwin made scientists, theologians, politicians, and 
eventually the average European rethink the most elementary contours of human 
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identity and the human connection to other sentient life.14 It has become common-
place to point out that Darwin’s theory placed out of reach the definitive break with 
animality by contradicting the belief that the origin of the human was not a singular 
event delivered by the intervention of some sublime agent (the Judeo-Christion myth 
of origin) in his proposal of an evolutionary continuum that rendered the difference 
between a human and an animal “as one of degree and not of kind.”15 Indeed, Darwin’s 
theory did offer liberation from the fixity of individual categories and insisted on the 
provisionary nature of species boundaries. As Margot Norris puts it: 
Darwin replaced this cybernetic model of Nature as a machine with his theory of 
natural selection, which removed intelligence […] altogether as the source of life and 
put in its place innumerable, dispersed, trivial organic forces operating unconsciously 
and irrationally, on an ad hoc basis subject to chance, over time.16  
 
Consequently, the development of life could no longer be seen as a series of closed 
and calculable processes the reason could uncover, explain and describe. Instead, there 
emerged a concept of chaotic, uncontrollable and inherently ungraspable development 
within which the category of species becomes profoundly unfixed:  
Certainly no clear line of demarcation has as yet been drawn between species and sub-
species – that is, the forms which in the opinion of some naturalists come very near 
to, but do not quite arrive at the rank of species; or, again, between sub- species and 
well- marked varieties, or between lesser varieties and individual differences. These 
differences blend into each other in an insensible series; and a series impresses the 
mind with the idea of an actual passage.17  
 
Combined with the exhaustive dismantling of the uniqueness of human emotional and 
mental capacities, as in The Descent of Man when Darwin famously states that “there 
is no fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals,”18 Darwin’s 
theory ostensibly had the capacity to bring about a fundamental change in human-
animal relationships. However, as Carrie Rohman notes, “despite the fact that 
Darwinism contains what could be considered the most radical philosophical blow to 
                                                 
14 Carrie Rohman, Stalking the Subject: Modernism and the Animal (New York: Columbia Press 
University, 2009) 2.  
15 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man (London: Penguin, 2004) 151.  
16 Margot Norris, Beasts of the Modern Imagination: Darwin, Nietzsche, Kafka, Ernst & Lawrence 
(Baltimore; London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985) 6. 
17 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (New York: Gramercy, 1979) 107. 
18 Darwin, The Descent of Man, 86.  
16 
 
anthropocentrism in the modern age, that blow was not immediately or consistently 
registered.”19 This can be attributed to a number of coping mechanisms and 
compensatory theories that strove to soften the blow. The key element in this struggle 
to preserve the existing order was, Rohman points out, “an overinvestment in the 
notion of progress.”20 As a result, the evolutionary process came to be seen as “a force 
driving nature towards a morally significant goal” and “the basis for human superiority 
was considered not so much eliminated as reframed in the late nineteenth century.”21 
People now see themselves, although not qualitatively different from the rest of the 
animal kingdom, as its most developed and most successful species, and therefore still 
entitled to dominate and exploit it. This line of thought informs one of the most 
influential social theories of the post-Darwinian era: social Darwinism, which “with 
its clinging to traditional notions of power and the development of civilizations, can 
be understood as a reinstantiation of human privilege projected onto racial and 
gendered taxonomies.”22  
The threat to humanism manifested in Darwin’s work is matched only by the 
implications of Sigmund Freud’s theories that appeared at the turn of the twentieth 
century.23 Importantly, Freud openly acknowledged that his work depended on 
Darwin’s intervention. As Akira Mizuta states in Electric Animal, “Freud later credited 
Darwin with forging a passage toward the world of unconscious activity, claiming that 
Darwin's theory of descent ‘tore down the barrier that had been arrogantly set up 
between man and beast’.”24 However, Freud’s own discourse can be considered as an 
attempt to compensate for the damage done to human superiority by the idea of the 
evolutionary continuum, as it is precisely with reinscribing the human-animal barrier 
that Freud’s own work is concerned. This is most clearly manifested in his theory of 
“organic repression” that states that the human emerges as the abjection of the animal. 
In Civilization and its Discontents, Freud imagines man’s transition from a quadruped 
                                                 
19 Rohman, Stalking the Subject, 5. 
20 Rohman, Stalking the Subject, 3. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Rohman, Stalking the Subject, 5.  
24 Akira Mizuta Lippit, Electric Animal: Toward a Rhetoric of Wildlife (Minneapolis; London: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1998) 76.  
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to a biped and the various results of this rising up from an animal way of being.25 Most 
importantly, walking upright means rising above blood and feces spread on the ground 
that, instead of exercising a sexually exciting effect in humans, now seem disgusting, 
leading in turn to a cultural trend toward cleanliness and the creation of sexual 
repression resulting in the foundation of the family, and from there on to the threshold 
of human civilization.26 As Cary Wolfe points out, the transition to a biped also 
involves a “shift of privilege in the sensorium from smell to sight, the nose to the 
eye.”27  
The texts analyzed in the following chapters will incorporate both Darwinism 
and Freudianism in their ideological framework and will offer a reevaluation of the 
implications that these theories offer for human subjectivity. The conceptual apparatus 
employed in this work in order to analyze this dynamic includes many thinkers that 
have contributed to the field of Animal Studies as well as other 20th century 
philosophers. However, it is mostly through the ideas of Jacques Derrida that the 
methodological framework for this thesis has been developed.  
The importance of Jacques Derrida’s philosophy to this project, as well as to 
the whole enterprise of Animal Studies, cannot be exaggerated. Deconstruction, as a 
mode of thought with enormous potential for questioning the status quo and unsettling 
assumptions, has proven to be a very effective tool for developing animal 
problematics. Referring to “the question of the animal”28 Derrida famously states, 
“[f]or me that will always have been the most important and decisive question. I have 
addressed it a thousand times, either directly or obliquely, by means of reading of all 
the philosophers I have taken an interest in.”29 However, it is in his later works 
appearing round the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, that this question starts to 
occupies a more central position.  
                                                 
25 Rohman, Stalking the Subject, 22. 
26 Cary Wolfe, Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003) 2.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Jacques Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” trans. David Wills, Critical 
Inquiry Vol. 28, 2002: 378. 
29 Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am,” 402.  
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Throughout his work, Derrida interrogates the ways in which Western 
metaphysical tradition approaches the question of the animal. In “The Animal That 
Therefore I Am” he argues that the animal only ever interests philosophers as an 
instrument for defining the human, exposing Western metaphysics as a discourse of 
“anthropocentric subjectivity that is recounted or allows a history to be recounted 
about it, autobiographically, the history of its life.”30 In this autobiography of the 
human, “the writing of the self as living,”31 the animal is always conceptualized 
through notions of lack or impoverishment (for example, the lack of language, reason, 
or the ability to die or  mourn and so on) to be something less than human. Not only 
does this logic secure “the unconditional superiority”32 of the human, but it also 
generates a limit whose function is to separate and to enclose “all the living things that 
man does not recognize as his fellows, his neighbors, or his brothers.”33 It is exactly 
this limit that Derrida ventures to deconstruct. This deconstruction happens not in the 
name of homogeneity, however, but rather is meant to reinscribe the multiplicity that 
has always, Derrida feels, been suppressed in the autobiographical discourse of human 
subjectivity. This suppression is manifested in the very term and the “catch-all”34 
concept of “the animal”. “The animal” in general singular claims to “designate every 
living thing that is held not to be a man”35 and abolishes “the infinite space that 
separates the lizard from the dog, the protozoon from the dolphin, the shark from the 
lamb, the parrot from the chimpanzee, the camel from the eagle, the squirrel from the 
tiger or the elephant from the cat”36 and so on. Derrida points out  that  
[t]his agreement concerning philosophical sense and common sense that allows one 
to speak blithely of the Animal in the general singular is perhaps one of the greatest, 
and most symptomatic idiocies of those who call themselves humans.37 
 
 He then proceeds to coin the neologism “animot” that, instead of effacing the limit 
between the animal and the human, “multiplies its figures.”38 Not only does this word 
                                                 
30 Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am,” 399. 
31 Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am,” 415. 
32 Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am,”  389. 
33 Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am,” 402. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am,” 400. 
36 Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am,” 402. 
37 Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am,” 409. 
38 Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am,” 398. 
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reinscribe the plural in the singular because it rhymes with “animaux”, but it also 
implies that the only thing known to us about animals are the names we have given 
them; the words, but not the beings themselves. Moreover, the proximity between the 
seemingly contrary words “mot” and “muet” (mute) suggests that animals can have 
language without having words: 
If, in order to hear it in myself, I were to undertake to overinterpret what the cat might 
be saying to me, in its own way, what it might be suggesting or simply signifying in 
a language of mute traces, that is to say without any words.39 
 
This thesis will not venture to replace all the general singulars of “the animal” with 
“animot”, but following Derrida’s example I ask the reader to silently substitute 
animot for every “animal” they come across while reading this work.  
What Derrida also finds worrying in the autobiographical project that is 
philosophy, is its “automatic, automobile, autonomous, auto-referential”40 nature: 
“Nothing risks becoming more poisonous than an autobiography, poisonous for itself 
in the first place, auto-infectious for the presumed signatory who is so auto-affected.”41 
The problem of automatism of thinking and the self-generating nature of thinking 
about animals constitutes the central concern of Derrida’s other lecture, namely “And 
Say the Animal Responded?” Here Derrida identifies the difference between response 
and reaction as the key one in establishing the single indivisible limit between animals 
and humans. It has always been assumed, he points out, that the animal is an instinctual 
being “capable only of a coded message or of a meaning that is narrowly indicative, 
strictly constrained; one that is fixed in its programmation,”42 while the human, on the 
contrary, is defined by the ability to react independently and spontaneously. However, 
he argues, Freud and Lacan have demonstrated that a fully self-present Cartesian 
subject is in fact a fiction. The unconscious “should prevent us from having any 
immediate and conscious assurance of the freedom presupposed by any notion of 
responsibility” and hence there is “some automaticity of the reaction in every 
response.”43 This also indicates that the way in which animals are treated by 
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philosophy and by what Derrida refers to as common sense (indeed, the very fact that 
philosophy and common sense are in agreement here is symptomatic) has more in 
common with reaction than response because it is characterized by confident and 
repetitive resort to the logic of the lack, and is furthermore predicated on the 
assumption of simple homogeneity lying on the other side of the boundary between 
the human and the animal. It is this reactive thinking of the animal question that 
Derrida attempts to expose and overcome.  
For Derrida, the unconditional limit enforced on the animal-human 
relationship is inherently connected to the abyss that separates two types of killing, 
sacrifice and murder. In the interview with Jean-Luc Nancy entitled “‘Eating Well,’ 
or the Calculation of the Subject” he argues that philosophy has never been able to 
“sacrifice sacrifice”44 and to challenge the “sacrificial structure” of the subject. The 
human-animal limit, constitutive of human subjectivity, empowers the logic within 
which the term “murder” applies only to “thy neighbor” and “thy brother”; in other 
words, a human other. Murder constitutes the ultimate transgression while sacrifice 
acquires the status of “a noncriminal putting to death”45 through which human 
superiority is manifested. In order to preserve the status of the master and the subject, 
the human has to sacrifice the animal both symbolically (in establishing that the human 
is realized through the abjection of animality), and physically (in the eating of animal 
flesh, etc.). This prompts Derrida to coin the term “carno-phallogocentrism”46 that 
refers to “the dominant schema of subjectivity”47 within which authority and 
autonomy are attributed “to the man (…) rather than to the woman, and to the woman 
rather than to the animal.”48 The logic of carno-phallogocentrism is, therefore, exposed 
as the logic of violent exclusion. At the end of the interview, Derrida argues that it is 
only through the deconstruction of this dominant schema that a new post-humanist 
concept of ethical responsibility can be achieved.  
Although not written as an ideological statement, my project is not opposed to 
the idea of producing socially relevant knowledge. Its great ambition is to contribute 
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to the development of this post-humanist responsibility, envisaged in the writings of 
Jacques Derrida and defined by its propensity for inclusion. Therefore, I bring together 
the canon of authors and thinkers who free the animal from the connotations of 
simplicity, homogeneity, impoverishment and fixity that normally persist 
unquestioned. My reading of their works is meant to place animality at the intersection 
of various representational strategies and approaches, in order to outline the principle 





2. Liminal Creatures: Animals in Ulysses 
Apart from so many other things, Joyce’s Ulysses is a narrative of living with 
animals, who feature profusely in the text of the novel. However, the animal question 
most certainly does not constitute the novel’s central concern. Nevertheless, as Derrida 
famously pointed out, Ulysses “plays with an entire archive of culture,” and in creating 
“the encyclopedic field of universitas,” it cannot ignore the question of the animal 
altogether.1 Joyce’s critics rarely pay much attention to the theme of animality in the 
novel although Joyce himself expressed keen interest in the blurry division between 
the human and the animal in his Paris notebook of 19042 and wrote at least two articles 
for different periodicals that dealt with animal-related issues.3 While these facts do not 
mean that Joyce was an animal rights advocate, they still signal the importance of the 
animal motif for his writing. In Ulysses, animals are not only omnipresent, but also 
cleared of the status of the known and simple. Here, Joyce problematizes many 
discourses that pretend to have an authority over animality, including the discourses 
of religion and literature.       
In the fourth episode of the novel, “Calypso”, Mr. Bloom is introduced through 
his interaction with “beasts.”4 This interaction is twofold, as it comprises two very 
different processes, namely devouring and communication. Indeed, the dichotomy 
between an attempt at understanding and a purely consumerist attitude is at the core 
of Bloom’s approach to the animal and runs through the whole text. It is also 
characteristic of “moral schizophrenia,”5 a term used by Gary Steiner to outline the 
contradiction between the assumption of moral responsibility towards animals that fall 
into the category of pets and the tendency to ignore the moral and ethical problems of 
exploiting other categories of animals.  Pet keeping as we know it today did not really 
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emerge until the 19th century,6 and by the beginning of the 20th century it was already 
a well-established commercial industry alongside the meat industry. The 
inconsistencies characterizing the ways people understand and treat animals in an 
industrial society were noticed already by an 18th century thinker Jeremy Bentham, 
and later by theosophists who are mentioned in the text on more than one occasion. 
Thus, it would not be too far-fetched to suggest that Joyce was exposed to these 
discourses and employed them to challenge certain received ideas on animality.     
By far the most memorable animal of the episode is “the pussens”. In fact, most 
readers would not even notice that other animals are actually present in “Calypso” for 
the simple reason that these obscure creatures are dismembered and deprived of their 
completeness:  
Mr Leopold Bloom ate with relish the inner organs of beasts and fowls. He liked thick 
giblet soup, nutty gizzards, a stuffed roast heart, liverslices fried with crustcrumbs, 
fried hencods' roes. Most of all he liked grilled mutton kidneys which gave to his 
palate a fine tang of faintly scented urine. (U 4.1-5) 
 
The cat, on the other hand, is not only alive and still complete with all her organs, but 
is actually perceived as a companion whom Bloom watches “curiously, kindly” (U 
4.21).  
 Maud Ellmann in her article “Ulysses: Changing into an Animal” suggests that 
pets, animaux familiers, especially cats and dogs, blur the boundary between the 
human and the inhuman and that it is precisely the problematization of this fine line 
that Joyce is preoccupied with in the first couple of pages of “Calypso.”7 The text 
demonstrates that the boarder is very flexible as it allows Bloom to move swiftly from 
eating animals (reinforcing the border) to talking to them (subverting the border). 
Simultaneously, the text gives us an impression that although the border is flexible and 
can be easily manipulated into suiting one’s purposes, its nature and premises are 
rarely questioned as even curious and sympathetic Bloom does not register the 
strangeness of the situation in which he loves one animal and eats another. However, 
pussens, being a liminal creature who has almost crossed the border and established 
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herself as belonging to the human part of the binary, successfully provokes Bloom into 
questioning common assumptions about animals.  
The interaction that happens between Bloom and his cat can be loosely 
described as a conversation. On the one hand, the words “answer” (U 4.18) and “to 
say” (U 4.32) are used to describe the cat’s contribution to the exchange; but on the 
other, it is more likely that the narrator renders what Bloom hears,  rather than what 
the cat speaks, which means that the reader is presented with a monologue after all. 
The hypothesis that it is Bloom’s consciousness that we follow and not the cat’s also 
provides us with a likely explanation of why the pussens’ statements gradually become 
longer and more complicated. John Gordon connects this oddity to the fact that Joyce’s 
aim was not to render passive registration of external reality but rather to depict the 
very process in which meaning is apprehended.8 Therefore, he argues, the first 
“Mkgnao” (U 4.16) “comes out of Bloom’s and not [the pussens].”9 Being curious, 
Bloom is truly interested in the message the cat is trying to deliver, he starts “pricking 
up his ears” 10 and achieves a more refined perception with each successive hearing. 
However, in his interpretation Gordon ignores the fact that just a couple of pages later 
Bloom answers to pussens with a lexicalized “miaow” (U 4.462). While at the 
beginning of the episode it was not clear whose consciousness is attempting a better 
understanding of the cat’s message, here the structure of the sentence leaves no space 
for doubt that this “miaow” belongs to Bloom: “Miaow! he said in answer” (U 4.462). 
Thus, there remains a possibility that in his discussion of “Calypso”, Gordon 
misattributes the curiosity to Bloom when in fact it is another undetected presence that 
is picking up its ears.  
To what extent the narrator is present in Ulysses is the issue that critics are still 
trying to resolve. In his monograph Voices and Values in Joyce’s Ulysses, Weldon 
Thornton looks at many critical statements about the intentional absence or presence 
                                                 
8 John Gordon, “’Mkgnao! Mrkgnao! Mrkgrnao!’: The Pussens Perplex,” Bloomsday 100: Essays On 
Ulysses, ed. Morris Beja and Anne Fogarty (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009) 32.  
9 Gordon, “Mkgnao! Mrkgnao! Mrkgrnao,” 34. 
10 Gordon also gives an interesting explanation as to why it is the sound “r” that is initially missed by 
Bloom: “I would suggest it is not accidental that the sound added each time, “r,” is the one that most 
likely would be missed by an inattentive, or less attentive, human listener. It is, in phonemic terms, a 
liquid, prone to blend with other sounds and at times to be crowded out in the process” (34).  
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of the narrator in the text and then proceeds to insist that the attempts to see Joyce’s 
Ulysses (and, more generally, modernist fiction as a whole) as a text aiming at 
complete effacement of detectable authorial presence are diminishing the novel’s 
scope of achievements. Thornton argues that Joyce does not eradicate the narrator, but 
uses it in an innovative manner and with a different goal in sight. He points out that 
instead of choosing a technique that would allow to conceal the authorial voice, 
namely first-person point of view or sheer interior monologue, in the first part of the 
novel Joyce chooses to present his material through the narrator who speaks in third 
person and past tense.11 He also argues that the authorial voice is detectable in the 
qualitative and evaluative statements that cannot be attributed to any of the characters12 
as well as in the scope of allusions present in the text: 
The allusive elements within the novel can originate from either the character or the 
author. Allusions introduced through the characters can be conscious, or they can exist 
more implicitly, on the margin of the character’s awareness. For example, when 
Bloom [thinking of Queen Victoria’s numerous progeny] says. ‘Old woman that lived 
in a shoe she had so many children’ [U 8. 394], his invocation of the nursery rhyme 
seems fully conscious, whereas when a few lines later he thinks, ‘Old Mrs Thorton 
was a jolly old soul’[U 8.394], the allusion to Old King Cole may be coming through 
him rather than from him. 13 
 
Thornton agrees that the narrator does not attract attention to itself or “projects a 
characterizable persona,”14 instead it merges with the characters’ perspectives. This 
technique, he insists, enables various degrees of affinity between individual characters 
and the narrative voice invoking “something like a gravitational field,”15 which is 
important to the project that Thornton identifies behind the novel, namely to the 
simulation of the collective mentality or psychic milieu that combines society’s ideas, 
values, beliefs, but also all kinds of narratives existing within it.    
In line with Thornton’s argument, the attempt to hear what the cat is saying can 
be attributed to the narrator’s blurred subjectivity that is closely connected to the 
characters’ perspectives but is not identical with them. This interpretation becomes 
even more plausible if we consider the fact that the narrator indeed makes itself visible 
                                                 
11 Weldon Thornton, Voices and Values in Joyce’s Ulysses (Gainesville: University of Florida, 2000) 46. 
12 Thornton, Voices and Values in Joyce’s Ulysses, 48.  
13 Thornton, Voices and Values in Joyce’s Ulysses, 80.  
14 Thornton, Voices and Values in Joyce’s Ulysses, 51.  
15 Thornton, Voices and Values in Joyce’s Ulysses, 53. 
26 
 
at the very beginning of the episode when the text suddenly switches from Bloom’s 
dining table to the narrator’s writing table: “The cat mewed in answer and stalked 
again stiffly round a leg of the table, mewing. Just how she stalks over my writingtable. 
Prr. Scratch my head. Prr” (U 4.18-20). Therefore, when Bloom thinks “They 
understand what we say better than we understand them” (U 4.26-27) immediately 
after hearing “Mrkgnao” the impulse for this thought may come not only from the 
pussens but also from the narrator or rather from this “gravitational field” that connects 
the narrator and the characters of the novel. 
Whether it comes from Bloom, from the narrator or from both, the episode 
demonstrates the tendency to avoid thinking about animals in Cartesian terms as 
beings simple and knowable. In doing so, it breaks with tradition and anticipates the 
way Derrida will approach the problem of animality one hundred years later. In his 
essay “The Animal That Therefore I Am” Derrida conceives of the animal as a being 
“that refuses to be conceptualized.”16 As language, our best instrument of 
understanding and constructing reality is alien to it; “animot” remains inconceivable 
to us. This approach to animality, which always starts with a genuinely curious look 
cast at a being who has been deemed undeserving of any philosophical curiosity, 
characterizes all texts analyzed in this thesis. However, the character of Bloom is 
especially emblematic of intellectual curiosity and the tendency to question even most 
basic assumptions and beliefs. Although in this episode Bloom’s doubts are very 
cautious and focus almost exclusively on his pet, in “Lestrygonians” he makes a step 
forward and starts challenging the practice of meat-eating.  
           While “Calypso” starts with mutton kidneys and then swiftly switches the 
pussens, “Lestrygonians” is not interested in pets, providing instead a deeper insight 
into the relationship established between people and animals used in the meat industry. 
In this episode concerned with killing and eating, “sacrifice” and “cannibalism” 
become key concepts.  
In his essay "Rams: Uninterrupted Dialogue—between Two Infinities, the 
Poem" and later in “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’" Derrida 
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describes carnivorous sacrifice as having fundamental importance for establishing and 
preserving the fundamental principles of Western civilization. For him every death, 
human or animal, is equal to the end of the world, the world as it was seen by a unique 
being that has disappeared.17 However, the Bible, which contains defining myths of 
Western Judeo-Christian civilization, maintains the distinction between a sacrifice and 
a non-sacrificial killing; the latter is explicitly forbidden while the former is not merely 
allowed, but perceived as necessary and encouraged. This distinction, Derrida argues, 
has its roots in the biblical story of the Binding of Isaac in which God asks Abraham 
to sacrifice his only son, Isaac. When God is satisfied with Abraham’s loyalty, he 
intervenes and a sheep is sacrificed instead of the child: “When the wood finds its 
proper destination and is set aflame, sacrificial law is restored; a passage is made from 
a morally contemptible slaying to one that is codified in Biblical law.”18 Thus, sacrifice 
becomes a legitimized killing which is immune to pity and, more importantly, is 
justified because it reinforces people’s connection with “God”, the concept that resists 
death: “God signifies this: death can bring an end to one world, but death does not 
signify the end of the entire world.”19 While animal sacrifice brings the end to one 
world, it does not signify the end of the entire world. Rather, animal sacrifice forges it 
“generating an aura of a higher life even as the animal is excluded from it.”20 The 
sacrifice sustains the order in which humans are seen as higher creatures and the 
masters of this world and its repetition permits us “to prove our identities time after 
time.”21  
Therefore, when Bloom thinks to himself, “[w]e are washed in the blood of the 
lamb. God wants blood victim. Birth, hymen, martyr, war, foundation of a building, 
sacrifice, kidney burntoffering, druids' altars. Elijah is coming” (U 8. 10-11), he feels 
the burden of a long tradition upon his shoulders and suspects that the cruelty of the 
sacrificial order established in the Old Testament has made its way into his times. This 
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sentiment becomes even clearer later in the passage that is often quoted by animal 
rights advocates:  
Pain to the animal too. Pluck and draw fowl. Wretched brutes there at the cattlemarket 
waiting for the poleaxe to split their skulls open. Moo. Poor trembling calves. Meh. 
Staggering bob. Bubble and squeak. Butchers' buckets wobbly lights. Give us that 
brisket off the hook. Plup. Rawhead and bloody bones. Flayed glasseyed sheep hung 
from their haunches, sheepsnouts bloodypapered snivelling nosejam on sawdust. Top 
and lashers going out. Don't maul them pieces, young one. (U 8. 722-728) 
 
Bloom starts feeling even more uncomfortable with the system whose functioning is 
secured by brutal sacrificial practices when he enters the Burton restaurant and is 
utterly disgusted by the sight of the present-day Lestrygonians:  
Couldn't eat a morsel here. Fellow sharpening knife and fork to eat all before him, old 
chap picking his tootles. Slight spasm, full, chewing the cud. Before and after. Grace 
after meals. Look on this picture then on that. Scoffing up stewgravy with sopping 
sippets of bread. Lick it off the plate, man! Get out of this. (U 8. 673-677) 
 
As Maud Ellman points out in her essay in The Cambridge Companion to English 
Novelists, throughout his work Joyce “reinforces the association between food and 
violence,” making visible certain disturbing aspects of eating rituals, the aspects that 
through their daily repetition and routinization become practically unnoticeable and 
thus are almost never reflected upon.22 In “Lestrygonians”, eating is exercised through 
violence, through fierce disintegration into pieces with the help of sharp tools:  
A pallid suetfaced young man polished his tumbler knife fork and spoon with his 
napkin. […] A man spitting back on his plate: halfmasticated gristle: gums: no teeth 
to chewchewchew it. Chump chop from the grill. Bolting to get it over. Sad booser's 
eyes. Bitten off more than he can chew. Am I like that? See ourselves as others see 
us. Hungry man is an angry man. Working tooth and jaw. (U 8. 656-663)   
 
By seeing, paying attention and reflecting upon the process of devouring (which he 
was still unable to do in “Calypso”) Bloom here breaks the unwritten law of animal 
sacrifice: he starts analyzing it, defamiliarizing its individual aspects and refusing to 
see things through the lenses of Judeo-Christian sacrificial laws.  
It should be pointed out that this is not the first time that Bloom is reflecting 
on the methods and strategies behind the meat industry and meat-eating per se. In 
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“Hades”, the funeral cortege is delayed by a drove of cattle. Upon seeing the cattle, 
Bloom remembers that “tomorrow is killing day” (U 6. 392) and half-automatically 
starts to dismember and process the animals: “And then the fifth quarter lost: all that 
raw stuff, hide, hair, horns. Comes to a big thing in a year. Dead meat trade. 
Byproducts of the slaughterhouses for tanneries, soap, margarine” (U 6. 394-397). 
However, he does not particularly like the path his thoughts have taken as he 
immediately suggests to his companions that “all those animals could be taken in 
trucks down to the boats” (U 6. 401-402) essentially saying that these animals and the 
purpose for which they are bred should not be made a spectacle of. In other words, 
Bloom thinks that animals doomed for slaughter should be concealed because they 
signify the dark and appalling part of the life in the city. As Declan Kiberd points out, 
Bloom thinks that eating is an activity that should be exercised in privacy and in a way 
that conceals the violent nature of the act, hence his disgust with the manner in which 
people consume their food at the Burton.23 In “Lestrygonians”, the reason behind 
Bloom’s urge to hide and to render invisible is uncovered. The episode demonstrates 
that the traces the meat industry leaves in the city, when noticed, invites further 
scrutiny that can lead to a dangerous outcome. Instead of delight and enthusiasm 
(which are the proper emotions to feel when one makes an offering to God) Bloom 
starts pitying dismembered brutes.  
It happens because in this episode Bloom is not absolutely sure that they are 
indeed brutes and not something entirely different. When Bloom thinks of the 
customers at the Burton (“See the animals feed” [U 8. 652]) he, to his own horror, fails 
to see the difference between the human and the animal. The same failure is evident 
in his human-animal comparisons: “Strong as a brood mare some of those horsey 
women” (U 8. 346) or “[t]hen having to give the breast year after year all hours of the 
night. Selfish those t.t's are. Dog in the manger” (U 8. 366).  Moreover, the episode is 
full of images that accentuate the “animality” of humans, their instincts and urges to 
eat and to copulate. Thus, as a result of Bloom’s careful consideration of the sacrificial 
order, the animal and the human merge in his mind and the object of sacrifice becomes 
unclear.  
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In Homer’s Odyssey the distinction between the human and the animal is also 
very blurry and needs to be constantly reinstated. The ultimate test of humanity in 
Homer is hospitality:  
[s]trangers who feed their guests are human, whereas those who eat their guests are 
monsters. What makes them monsters, however, is the fact that they are cannibals; 
which means they must be human, not animals. In the land of the Lestrygonians, 
Odysseus sends forth scouts to determine “what men, eaters of bread, might live here 
in this country,” but the inhabitants prove to be eaters of men.24  
 
 Thus, as Ellmann points out, the blurry border between the animal and the human 
infinitely complicates the notion of cannibalism and Joyce’s “Lestrygonians” has this 
problem for one of its central motifs. “Who eats who?” – is the question that the 
episode asks but does not answer. Not only are the customers at the Burton portrayed 
as cannibals,25 but also Bloom himself feels as if he has been “eaten and spewed” (U 
8.695). Thus, by the Homeric logic of hospitality, the humans are turned into monsters 
that devour each other. Also, the multiple hints at cannibalistic tendencies in a meat-
eating society signal that the long-standing line between the human and the animal is 
disappearing and meat eating becomes one of the forms of cannibalism.  After all, it is 
the moment in history when the ideas of vegetarian theosophists, who make an attempt 
to unsettle the unhealthy relationship between humans and animals, acquire curtain 
popularity. Although neither Bloom nor Stephen sympathize with them, their 
discourse exists and leaves traces everywhere in the city.  
In Ulysses, cannibalistic elements that underpin civilized society are exposed 
not only though Homer’s unclear distinction between people and monsters and the 
discourse of theosophists, but also through the Christian sacramental rite based on a 
cannibalistic metaphor. Bloom’s choice to have some bread and wine at the end of 
“Lestrygonians” can be interpreted as an allusion to this important Christian ritual, 
although the cheese also included in his meal “violates the patriarchal purity of the 
Communion service, in which the male priest appropriates the role of the maternal 
breast, feeding the communicants the ‘substance’ of the son, as opposed to the mere 
‘matter’ of the mother’s milk.”26 Thus, trying to escape from one set of cannibalistic 
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aspects and making a vegetarian choice, Bloom comes dangerously close to the 
symbolic cannibalism of Catholic Church that he repudiates in “Lotus Eaters”: “Rum 
idea: eating bits of a corpse. Why the cannibals cotton to it” (U 5. 352). Therefore, 
eating in Ulysses is never just a simple satisfaction of a physical need. Rather, food 
consumption in the novel often illustrates the scavenging nature of a creation in which 
everything feeds of everything else and thus alludes to the method of Ulysses “that 
spits back half-masticated gristle, each time it summarizes and reprocesses earlier 
material.”27 Moreover, through rendering visible the typically unnoticed aspects of 
meat-eating, Joyce makes the unstable symbolic structure behind these practices 
observable and therefore vulnerable.  
 One limit that is not tested in “Lestrygonians” is the limit of language. While 
the cat in “Calypso” finds a way to communicate with Bloom, the brutes in the eighth 
episode are mute. The sounds that Bloom hears in his head thinking of their cruel fate 
(“Moo” and “Meh”) are lexicalized oversimplifications, the words of human language 
that have nothing to do with animals’ subjectivity. The situation, however, is different 
in “Cyclops”, where the dog Garryowen (or later Owen Garry) is not mute and is not 
communicating in its own language, but speaks Irish. While the previous episodes deal 
with animals in a more or less realistic manner, rendering animals organic part of the 
city’s life, Garryowen in “Cyclops” is not a real dog but rather a symbol and an 
example of what often happens to animals in literature. Deprived of unique 
personality, of the otherness “that refuses to be conceptualized,” the dog in this episode 
is a doppelgänger of its owner, the citizen. It is the second Cyclops of the episode 
whose cruelty and monstrosity, however, are recognized and acknowledged by the 
narrator as well as by other characters (“The bloody mongrel let a grouse out of him 
would give you the creeps. Be a corporal work of mercy if someone would take the 
life of that bloody dog. I'm told for a fact he ate a good part of the breeches off a 
constabulary man in Santry that came round one time with a blue paper about a 
licence” [U 12. 126-128]), while the monstrosity of the citizen goes unnoticed by 
everyone except Bloom. Much like the citizen is not (or is not meant to give an 
impression of) a real person but rather a conglomeration of stereotypes and 
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expectations, Garryowen is a metaphoric figure overloaded with multiple levels of 
symbolism and, towards the end, anthropomorphized to a point of absurdity.  
Taking after his master, Garryowen is unreasonably aggressive and excessively 
stubborn. However, according to some critics, the burden of anthropocentric 
symbolism that the dog has to carry is even heavier than metaphoric references to its 
master’s dark personality. In his essay “Garryowen and the Bloody Mangy Mongrel 
of Irish Modernity,” Sam Slote argues that the dog, being a mongrel, symbolizes the 
hybridity of Irish society: “For Joyce, however, dogs are always mongrels […] and it 
is precisely in this mongrelization that they might have some affinity to the Irish.”28 
Although this hybridity is repeatedly denied by the citizen, who refuses to recognize 
Bloom, a Jew, as an Irishman, it is emphasized by the fact that he himself speaks 
English as well as by the list of “Irish” heroes to which he belongs together with Dante 
Alighieri, Christopher Columbus and some others (U 12. 176-179). Thus, the dog 
symbolizes diverse Ireland that lies at the feet of its devoted citizen (and is almost 
entirely ignored by him) as well as this citizen’s dark and conflicting unconsciousness.  
The moment in the text when Owen Garry starts reciting poetry, however, 
remains highly problematic. By using human language he crosses the ultimate border 
between the species, language and, consequently, reason always being at the heart of 
humans’ superiority. Unfortunately, however, his poem is lacking in philosophical 
depth and can add nothing to the discussion that has been happening in the pub. 
Essentially, he asks for water to quench his thirst. Therefore, even after he has been 
given the gift of language Owen Garry remains a dumb brute whose existence is 
defined and whose every motion is guided by hunger and thirst, the intimation being 
that unless human genius enriches it with some symbolism and connotations, the 
animal has nothing to offer. 
However, the text of the novel does not restrict itself to the reductive approach 
to Garryowen demonstrated in “Cyclops”. We also catch two glimpses of the dog 
through the eyes of other characters. In “Circe”, Bloom thinks of the importance of 
talking to animals and calls the dog “Good Fellow” (U 15.663). In “Nausicaa”, Gerty 
                                                 
28 Sam Slote, “Garryowen and the Bloody Mangy Mongrel of Irish Modernity,” James Joyce Quarterly 
Vol. 46. 2009: 547. 
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ncludes a photograph of the dog in her fantasy of a perfect household: “and the 
photograph of grandpapa Giltrap's lovely dog Garryowen that almost talked it was so 
human” (U 13.233). Both Bloom and Gretty adopt a strikingly different approach than 
the one demonstrated by the narrative strategies of “Cyclops”. Instead of reducing 
Garryowen to a number of ideologically charged concepts and symbols, they view him 
as the other who needs to be understood and are willing to expand the borders of their 
sympathy. In this gesture of expansion, they disregard the most important animal-
human divide and invest the dog with the ability to understand and even produce 
language.    
In “The Animal That Therefore I Am” Derrida says: “For thinking concerning 
the animal, if there is such a thing, derives from poetry.”29 He then proceeds to argue 
that only the language of fiction with its efforts to express the inexpressible and the 
recourses to succeed in this formidable task has a chance to contribute to our 
understanding of the absolute other, the “animot”. Unlike the discourses of science 
and philosophy, the language of literature can avoid the attempts to explain and 
simplify animals, accentuating instead their complexity. Joyce’s Ulysses is precisely 
the kind of literature Derrida has in mind: the text hints at the animal’s unknown 
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3. Virginia Woolf’s Flush as an Anti-Anthropocentric 
Project  
It is only recently that Flush: a Biography has gained entry into Woolf’s 
modernist canon. For a long time the text was written off as a trivial escapade1 with 
early critics dismissing it either as a diversion from Woolf’s more demanding 
endeavors or as a piece of second-rate literature beneath the talent of its author.2 When 
Flush did start attracting critics’ attention, it was from the feminist perspective that 
most of them chose to approach it, presenting the text as a feminist allegory of the 
subjugation of women in Victorian England.3 While this in itself has been an important 
step in the history of the text’s critical reception, it is possible to develop an even more 
complex critical approach within which Flush the dog will not be perceived as a mere 
metaphor but as an animal with its own agency and role in the narrative. However, it 
can be argued that the very nature of the text resists such an interpretation. Indeed, 
critics like Jutta Ittner insist that because Flush in the novel is so thoroughly 
anthropomorphized, the traces of animality disappear from the text.4 While Ittner is 
right in pointing out the danger of anthropomorphism that lies in subsuming the animal 
within a human world without taking on board the different experiences specific to 
different species, her reading remains blind to the post-humanist potential of the text.5 
This reading, on the other hand, will focus on the ways in which Flush subverts the 
logic of humanism and anthropocentrism. It will demonstrate that it is only through 
seeing and recognizing animal presence in the novel, that we can achieve a more 
complex interpretation of Flush within which patriarchy becomes inextricably 
intertwined with other forms of oppression. 
                                                 
1 Derek Ryan, Virginia Woolf and the Materiality of Theory: Sex, Animal, Life (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2013) 132. 
2 Karalyn Kendall-Morwick, “Mongrel Fiction: Canine Bildung and the Feminist Critique of 
Anthropocentrism in Woolf’s Flush,” MFS Modern Fiction Studies, 60.3, 2014: 507. 
3 Craig Smith, “Across the Widest Gulf: Nonhuman Subjectivity in Virginia Woolf's Flush,” Twentieth 
Century Literature, 48. 3, 2002: 349. 
4 Jutta Ittner, “Part Spaniel, Part Canine Puzzle: Anthropomorphism in Woolf’s Flush and Auster’s 
Timbuktu,” Mosaic, April 2006: 190. 
5 Ryan, Virginia Woolf and the Materiality of Theory, 134.  
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The difference between the ways in which humans and animals experience the 
world is, indeed, often ignored in the novel. A good example of a rather blunt 
anthropomorphism in the text is the moment when Flush contemplates himself in a 
mirror and rethinks his identity. However, it can be argued that Woolf introduces such 
moments into the narrative not to eliminate the animal presence but rather to intensify 
it. Marjorie Garber writes in Dog Love that “anthropomorphism is another word for 
empathy,”6 implying that it is a strategy of establishing an emotional connection with 
an animal and that it reveals willingness to focus on similarities between species rather 
than their differences. This perspective undermines the notion that nature and the 
animal can only be understood through objective, unemotional, scientific approach. 
Within this logic, art and imagination are powerful tools for exploring human nature, 
but nothing more than sentimental trifles when concerned with animality. Woolf, on 
the other hand, contends that a certain degree of anthropomorphism is inevitable when 
we try to understand the animal not as a biological machine, but a conscious presence 
in the world, as it is only through empathy and imagination that we can gain access to 
the consciousness that cannot express itself in words.7 However, she also recognizes 
that any attempt to render the unique way in which one particular animal experiences 
the world is bound to be inaccurate. Flush uses third-person narration and has a fully 
realized teller, who is the source of the narration, and a reflector or the center of 
consciousness, through whose vantage point the narrated events are presented.8 That 
Flush’s life is described to the reader by this narrative presence can be interpreted as 
Woolf’s recognition of the fact that we do not have an unmediated access to his 
experience and thus a part of it will always remain a mystery. Indeed, one of the 
novel’s primary goals is to establish the otherness of Flush, to emphasize that his 
sensibility differs dramatically from that of humans. Therefore, the novel presents 
itself as an imperfect attempt to capture Flush’s experience and constantly makes 
allowances for possible inaccuracies. The first chapter informs us that “all researches 
have failed to fix with any certainty the exact year of Flush's birth, let alone the month 
                                                 
6 Marjorie Garber, Dog Love (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996) 23.  
7 A similar approach to animal representation is offered by Elizabeth Costello and is discussed in the 
last chapter of this thesis.  
8 David Herman, “Modernist Life Writing and Nonhuman Lives: Ecologies of Experience in Virginia 
Woolf’s Flush,” Modern Fiction Studies, 59. 3, 2013: 554. 
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or the day”9 pointing out that animals live outside history and therefore its discourse 
cannot provide much information about them. In addition, the text repeatedly 
accentuates Miss Barrett’s inability to understand Flush as well as her tendency to 
misjudge and misinterpret him. This is sometimes attributed to her failure to distance 
her speculations on Flush from her own emotions: “But here Miss Barrett, absorbed in 
her own emotions, misjudged him completely” (44). Other times, however, the 
misunderstanding has no specific reason, apart from there being no means of accessing 
the dog’s consciousness: “When about this time Miss Barrett observed him staring in 
the glass, she was mistaken. He was a philosopher, she thought, meditating the 
difference between appearance and reality. On the contrary, he was an aristocrat 
considering his points” (23). Although, for reasons unexplained in the text, the narrator 
has infinitely more insights into Flush’s mind than Miss Barrett, it also has to 
acknowledge that there is only so much of Flush’s experience that it can include in 
this biography, one of the reasons being that “it was in the world of smells that Flush 
mostly lived” (86) and “there are no more than two words and a half for what we 
smell” (86). Because Flush’s reality is to a large extent olfactory and in this respect 
differs immensely from the one in which humans operate (vision being the most 
developed of our senses) language, the human system for conceptualizing experience, 
cannot give us a clear picture of Flush’s life. It is important that this idea appears rather 
late in the novel, in the second half of the penultimate chapter to be precise, thus 
undermining the idea of a dog’s biography after the reader has almost finished one. 
This humorous maneuver, therefore, further emphasizes the unreliability of the 
narrator that has already undermined itself through the constant use of irony and the 
unwillingness to fully show and explain itself. Thus, the narrator is not a reliable 
conductor of Flush’s experience. Instead, it represents some kind of agency that is 
willing to make an attempt at understanding the life of a dog but is fully aware of the 
inherent deficiency of such attempt. It posits itself somewhere in between the human 
and the canine world, which is emphasized in the frequent employment of free indirect 
speech that makes it hard to distinguish between the moments when the narrator 
                                                 
9 Virginia Woolf, Flush, ed. Kate Flint (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 9. All future page 
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presents its own thoughts and the moments when it attempts to render Flush’s thinking 
process. Thus, Flush’s otherness is established on multiple levels and it is in this 
otherness and the ways it relates to the human that the message of the novel is to be 
found.  
Flush’s role and position in the human world as presented in the novel is best 
understood through his relationship with Miss Barrett. Here, the link between the 
oppression of women and the oppression of animals becomes visible and assumes 
crucial importance. The idea that the two are interconnected phenomena was 
circulating in English society at least since the 19th century when animal rights became 
a real concern in England and when the Cruelty to Animals Act was passed by the 
Parliament in 1835. This change in legislation became possible partly due to the active 
involvement of women. Current studies suggest that women have been at the forefront 
of animal activism in Great Britain at least since 1800,10 consistently outnumbering 
men in clubs, societies and campaigns devoted to animal welfare. One of the reasons 
for such an active involvement of women in the animal cause may be traced to 
Victorian domestic ideology that insisted on separate spheres and separate roles for 
men and women. “Men worked in the world while women nurtured at home, 
instructing children in moral tenets.”11 Within this ideology, women as nurturers 
whose role in society demanded affectability and sensibility were far more likely to 
feel sympathy for animals than Victorian men whose self-identification was 
inseparable from rationality and pragmatism. However, there is another reason for 
women’s active involvement in the animal cause. As Coral Lansbury suggests, the 
19th century saw the growing degree of women’s identification with animals: 
“Women saw themselves as horses being flogged and beaten, and many saw their own 
condition hideously and accurately embodied in the figure of an animal bound to a 
table by straps with the vivisector’s knife at work on its flesh.”12 Women’s vulnerable 
                                                 
10 Emily Gaarder, “The ‘Gender’ Question of Animal Rights: Why are Women the Majority,” 
Allacademic.com, All Academic Inc, 
<http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/0/3/8/6/pages103868/p10
3868-1.php 2006> 12 April 2016 
11 Moira Ferguson, Animal Advocacy and Englishwomen, 1780-1900 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of 
Michigan Press, 1998) 131. 
12 Coral Lansbury, The Old Brown Dog: Women, Workers, and Vivisection in Edwardian England 
(Madison, Wis.; London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985) 84. 
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position in patriarchal society, their place in the medical discourse of the epoch 
(manuals of physiology and gynecology taught that women were incomplete males, 
with the clitoris and hymen as an undeveloped penis)13 and, maybe most disturbingly, 
gynecological practices that required a woman to be fastened to a chair or table (thus 
reinforcing the similarity between gynecological practices and vivisection)14 –  all this 
contributed to the growing identification with suffering animals. 
In the first chapters of Flush, the male and female realms are clearly separated. 
Miss Barrett is hardly allowed to leave her room and all her visitors are women. It is 
this realm, which is reduced to only one room of the house, walks in a park and 
occasional shopping expeditions, that Flush finds himself in. The novel then follows 
the development of an alliance between a woman and a dog formed against the forces 
of patriarchal tyranny. As in the social and political context of the period, in Flush a 
woman and an animal are brought together by the struggle for a freer existence. Woolf 
does not only capture the arrangement of Victorian society within which women and 
animals found themselves entangled together, but uses their entanglement to criticize 
the existing system. By focusing on their unfavorable circumstances, their struggle and 
eventual victory (the escape to Italy) she makes women and animals allies in whom 
the hope lies for a much needed transformation: “We are joined in sympathy. We are 
joined in hatred. We are joined in defiance of black and beetling tyranny. We are joined 
in love” (60). The novel, therefore, suggests that animals and women are both victims 
of patriarchal system and should resist it together. The best example of this cooperation 
is the moment in the novel when Miss Barrett decides to save Flush from the hands of 
the dognappers in spite of the fact that her future husband, her father and her brother 
all try to persuade her that it is a wrong thing to do. Eventually, however, he poet 
plucks up the courage for her first revolt and is able to resist the dominant patriarchal 
viewpoint within which Flush’s life is less valuable than abstract principles of justice 
and injustice and Miss Barrett’s attachment to the dog is interpreted as blameworthy 
sentimentalism.  Mr. Browning writes to her that if she pays the ransom  
she was giving way to tyranny; she was giving way to blackmailers; she was 
increasing the power of evil over right, of wickedness over innocence. If she gave 
Taylor his demand, “. . . how will the poor owners fare who have not money enough 
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for their dogs' redemption?” [...] He did not blame Miss Barrett – nothing she did 
could be anything but perfectly right, perfectly acceptable to him. Still, he continued 
on Friday morning, “I think it lamentable weakness. . . .” (60) 
 
Miss Barrett, however, finds herself strong enough to resist this bizarre logic according 
to which the privileged (the owners) are poor and the poor are powerful. This gesture 
against patriarchy is the first step towards her ultimate rebellion against it – the 
elopement.15  
Another important revolt in the novel is the revolt that Woolf accomplishes 
when she chooses to make a good-natured companion dog, almost a lap dog (at least 
one time in the novel Flush travels on Miss Barrett’s lap [20]) the protagonist of her 
novel. In doing so, she rejects the modernist inclination to focus on wild, fierce and 
dangerous animals rather than timid domesticated creatures. This tendency is well 
represented by the works of D.H. Lawrence and Ernest Hemingway who were part of 
an intellectual movement known as primitivism, which became closely associated with 
the rise of modernist poetics: 
The accepted account of modernism is that the movement arose as a challenge to the 
received verities of Victorian and Edwardian modernity, and gained its greatest 
momentum as a result of the First World War. Belief in the supreme humaneness of 
European civility, social advancement through technological innovation, and the 
imperialist narrative of progress was severely compromised by a conflict in which the 
metropolitan powers exterminated a generation of each other’s citizens using the most 
advanced technologies yet produced – poison gas, tanks, flamethrowers, machine 
guns, battleships and bi-planes. Disgusted by the inventive brutality of modern 
“civilization”, the modernists were propelled into its conventional opposite: 
primitivism.16  
 
Primitivism perceives the influences of civilization as stiffening and deadening. It sees 
humanity’s only chance of rejuvenation in its reconnection with the repressed 
animality and seeks a “relapse” into the primitive. While discussing modernist 
primitivism in connection with D.H. Lawrence and Ernest Hemingway, Philip 
Armstrong notices that both writers tended to focus their reconsideration of the animal-
human relationship on formidable savage creatures (often domesticated but 
disobedient) while regarding docile domesticated animals as contemptible slaves who 
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have lost connection to the rejuvenating primordial energies.17 Woolf, however, rejects 
this tendency. Although she is interested in animality, she chooses to focus on a 
companion animal undermining the wild vs. domesticated opposition and refusing to 
believe that a good-natured dog is less of an animal than a fierce bull; thus also forming 
a symbolic alliance with Flush in order to resist the ultra-male and patriarchal 
ideological framework of primitivism. However, Woolf’s revolt has multiple layers. 
In choosing to focus on a lap dog or almost a lap dog Woolf also seeks to satirize and 
to reform another literary discourse, this time an openly misogynist one.  
Lap dogs or lady’s companion dogs, as well as ladies themselves, have been 
often treated unfavorably by literature. In her study of the animal in modern 
imagination entitled Homeless Dogs and Melancholy Apes, Laura Brown notices that 
companion dogs, who became an important part of gendered image that was used to 
satirize femininity already by Chaucer, occupied an especially important place in the 
misogynist tradition of the 1680s and 1690s and, finally, played a significant role in 
the literary imagination of the 18th century.18 Brown notices that in the late 17th and 
18th century (the time of the rapid rise of pet culture) the satirists persistently portrayed 
lap-dogs and their mistresses as sexual partners. Unlike human suitors, dogs were 
allowed to the ladies’ beds, to the forbidden place between their thighs and onto their 
chests. Moreover, caresses and kisses that ladies extended to their dogs were often 
seen as explicitly sexual acts:19 
Securely on her Lap it lies, 
Or freele gaze on her Eyes; 
To touch her breast, may share the Bliss, 
And unreprov’d, may snatch a Kiss.20  
 
Lap-dogs become undeserving rivals, “both an inappropriate sexual partner for the 
woman and also a metonym for female sexuality - a dynamic that places the animal 
simultaneously within and outside the realm of the human, or - from another 
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perspective - places the woman both within and outside the realm of the animal.”21 
The satires achieve a twofold goal: they accentuate the woman’s affinity with the 
animal as well as, on a more obvious level, criticize common female vices: dullness 
of mind, sentimentality, idleness and so on. While Brown lists multiple examples of 
lap-dogs in 18th century satires, Alexander Pope’s The Rape of the Lock seems to be 
the one most relevant to the story of Flush. In the poem where fashionable female is 
criticized for her proximity to her lap-dog in preference to her husband22 there is a 
moment when Belinda is woken up by her dog Shock: “Shock, who thought she slept 
too long, / Leapt up, and wak’d his Mistress with his tongue.”23 The tongue here 
functions as a “vivid signal of interspecies intimacy.”24 In Flush, we encounter a very 
similar scene. When Miss Barrett lies on her bed thinking and apparently experiencing 
a fit of melancholia Flush wakes her up from this unpleasant daydream: 
She was lying, thinking; she had forgotten Flush altogether, and her thoughts were so 
sad that the tears fell upon the pillow. Then suddenly a hairy head was pressed against 
her; large bright eyes shone in hers; and she started. Was it Flush, or was it Pan? Was 
she no longer an invalid in Wimpole Street, but a Greek nymph in some dim grove in 
Arcady? And did the bearded god himself press his lips to hers? For a moment she 
was transformed; she was a nymph and Flush was Pan. The sun burnt and love blazed. 
(27) 
 
This is a landmark moment in their relationship as Miss Barrett remembers it later in 
the text when she considers whether she should forgive Flush for biting Mr. Browning: 
“Once he had roused her with a kiss, and she had thought that he was Pan” (48). This 
is also a reference to one of Elizabeth Barrett Browning's most famous poems featuring 
her dog – “Flush or Faunus” – that served as one of the inspirations for the novel. The 
episode traces the events of the poem (Flush startling Miss Browning and reminding 
her of Faunus and Pan) but makes their intimacy far more visible. While in the poem 
the dog only rubs his ears against the poet’s face: “a drooping ear / Did flap me on 
either cheek,”25 in the novel there is a kiss. In the poem, Flush is a “low creature”, a 
mere conductor between her and the abstract “heights of love”: 
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But as my bearded vision closelier ran 
My tears off, I knew Flush, and rose above 
Surprise and sadness; thanking the true Pan, 
Who, by low creatures, leads to heights of love.26 
 
Woolf, on the other hand, changes the accents drastically and presents the bedside 
intimacy scene as a climax in the relationship between Flush and the poet, a love scene, 
combining the events from Barret Browning’s poem with the overemphasized 
sexuality so characteristic of the misogynist tradition and of the Pope’s poem. Indeed, 
taking into account Woolf’s tendency to avoid any straightforward depictions of 
sexual acts, her attention to quality and intensity of the sexual emotion rather than 
specific events,27 we might see this episode if not as an act of bestiality, then at least 
as the moment that characterizes the connection between the two protagonists as not 
devoid of sexual undertones. That the scene is a straightforward reference to the 
poetics of 18th century satire and to the work of Alexander Pope is further accentuated 
later when Flush and Mr. Browning become rivals. Woolf, therefore, distances herself 
from rough primitivism with its taste for exotic locations, exceptional animals and 
humans as well as from the abstract idealism of Barret Browning choosing instead to 
go back to the tradition that saw the animal as an integral part of people’s day-to-day 
lives. Woolf’s poetic rendering of the scene clears this relationship of all negative and 
misogynist connotations presenting the union between a woman and a dog as a true 
friendship, indeed as love. Thus, while the satirists saw this relationship as whimsical 
and unnatural using it as a tool to criticize women and Barret saw it as a mere 
instrument for achieving the goal of transcendental love, Woolf sees it as full of 
affection, physical as well as spiritual, and, even more importantly, as having the 
potential for subversion of patriarchal system, because it is in this relationship that 
Miss Barrett finds the strength and courage for her revolt.  
However, Woolf does not stop at accentuating the revolutionary potential of 
the cooperation between a woman and an animal. She is willing to complicate matters 
even further by pointing out that Flush’s relationship with Miss Barrett is dramatically 
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unbalanced and thus demonstrating that inequality upon which English society is 
based contaminates its members in so many ways that sometimes they are hard to trace 
or recognize. While their friendship has a positive, inspiring effect on the poet, the 
impact it has on Flush is rather dubious. While Flush is developing a loving and 
affectionate relationship with Miss Barrett, he is also gradually losing his vigor. From 
a dog that ran through the fields and responded to the calls of hunting and love, he is 
changing into something passive, something too gentle for any outdoor activities, 
something that is almost not a dog any more: 
Such an education as this, in the back bedroom at Wimpole Street, would have told 
upon an ordinary dog. And Flush was not an ordinary dog. He was high-spirited, yet 
reflective; canine, but highly sensitive to human emotions also. Upon such a dog the 
atmosphere of the bedroom told with peculiar force. We cannot blame him if his 
sensibility was cultivated rather to the detriment of his sterner qualities. Naturally, 
lying with his head pillowed on a Greek lexicon, he came to dislike barking and biting; 
he came to prefer the silence of the cat to the robustness of the dog; and human 
sympathy to either. (30) 
 
Flush’s residence with Miss Barrett is referred to as sacrifice in the text: “She was too 
just not to realize that it was for her that he had sacrificed his courage, as it was for her 
that he had sacrificed the sun and the air” (33). The change from the green fields of 
Reading to the dangerous streets of London proves to be a drastic experience for the 
dog. On the whole, London, where Flush receives his “education”, is portrayed by 
Woolf as a place where pretense, discipline and oppression prevail. It is an 
environment where all Flush’s instincts are “thwarted and contradicted” (24). The 
oppressive discipline of the city is emblematized in Flush’s experience of Regent’s 
Park. Trees and grass are there not for enjoyment but for a mere spectacle:28 
But now a heavy weight jerked at his throat; he was thrown back on his haunches. 
Were there not trees and grass? he asked. Were these not the signals of freedom? [...] 
He paused. Here, he observed, the flowers were massed far more thickly than at home; 
they stood, plant by plant, rigidly in narrow plots. The plots were intersected by hard 
black paths. Men in shiny top-hats marched ominously up and down the paths. [...] 
Setting one thing beside another, he had arrived at a conclusion. Where there are 
flower-beds there are asphalt paths; where there are flower-beds and asphalt paths, 
there are men in shiny top-hats; where there are flower-beds and asphalt paths and 
men in shiny top-hats, dogs must be led on chains. (22) 
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In the novel, Wimpole Street is a place where dogs are stolen and tortured because 
they are perceived as commodities. It is a realm of excessive and meaningless 
consumerism. Miss Barrett only ever leaves home to go shopping although her 
bedroom is already packed with various useless objects:  
On top of the wardrobe stood three white busts; the chest of drawers was surmounted 
by a bookcase; the bookcase was pasted over with crimson merino; the washing-table 
had a coronal of shelves upon it; on top of the shelves that were on top of the washing-
table stood two more busts. (16-17) 
 
 However, the most significant element of Wimpole Street’s environment and the one 
that forces the Brownings to move to Italy is its tendency to accumulate and thrive on 
domination in its various forms. Even Mr. Browning’s courtship is not free of 
connotations of domination: “Twisting his yellow gloves in his hands, blinking his 
eyes, well groomed, masterly, abrupt, Mr. Browning strode across the room. He seized 
Miss Barrett's hand, and sank into the chair by the sofa at her side. Instantly they began 
to talk” (38). On a subtler note, meat-eating is also conceived as an extension of 
tyranny and domination into the culinary habits of those involved in this structure. In 
one long sentence at the end of the first chapter Woolf portrays meat-eating as one of 
the key elements of the existing order: 
Indeed, when the world seems tumbling to ruin, and civilization rocks on its 
foundations, one has only to go to Wimpole Street; to pace that avenue; to survey 
those houses; to consider their uniformity; to marvel at the window curtains and their 
consistency; to admire the brass knockers and their regularity; to observe butchers 
tendering joints and cooks receiving them; to reckon the incomes of the inhabitants 
and infer their consequent submission to the laws of God and man--one has only to go 
to Wimpole Street and drink deep of the peace breathed by authority in order to heave 
a sigh of thankfulness that, while Corinth has fallen and Messina has tumbled, while 
crowns have blown down the wind and old Empires have gone up in flames, Wimpole 
Street has remained unmoved and, turning from Wimpole Street into Oxford Street, a 
prayer rises in the heart and bursts from the lips that not a brick of Wimpole Street 
may be re-pointed, not a curtain washed, not a butcher fail to tender or a cook to 
receive the sirloin, the haunch, the breast, the ribs of mutton and beef for ever and 
ever, for as long as Wimpole Street remains, civilisation is secure. (14) 
 
Thus, in an almost primitivist move, the bitter irony of this sentence connects 
oppressive discipline and tyranny of Wimpole street with the notion of civilization in 
which, Woolf understands, domination and tyranny are omnipresent.  
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Domination logically presupposes inequality and it cannot be a coincidence 
that under the influence of London’s environment Flush becomes preoccupied with 
the issues of inequality among dogs as well as people. After all, the first section of the 
novel that deals with the regulations of The Spaniel Club, its breeding policies and its 
focus on purity (“to be born with a light nose or a topknot is nothing less than fatal” 
[7]) appeared in the first installment in the October 1933 issue of Atlantic Monthly 
alongside a review of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kapmf by Alise Hamilton.29 
Early in the second chapter, Flush discovers that dogs in London “are not 
equal, but different” (22) and rushes home to look at himself in the mirror and is soon 
relieved to find out that he is indeed “a dog of birth and breeding” (23). Therefore, 
Flush’s education prompts him to adopt certain prejudices against some of the 
representatives of his own spices or, in human terms, to become a racist.  
In order to avoid the corrupting effects of London, the Brownings and Flush 
flee to Italy that is portrayed as an idyllic place where all dogs are equal and Flush 
quickly renounces the notion of aristocracy: “Flush suddenly bethought him of 
Regent's Park and its proclamation: Dogs must be led on chains. Where was ‘must’ 
now? Where were chains now? Where were park-keepers and truncheons? Gone, with 
the dog-stealers and Kennel Clubs and Spaniel Clubs of a corrupt aristocracy!” (77). 
In Italy, the relationship between Flush and Mrs. Browning changes dramatically; it 
loses in intimacy but both partners gain in happiness. Flush becomes independent, 
roaming freely the streets of Italian cities, while Mrs. Browning, with her health 
improving, learns how to enjoy the outside world: 
She was a different person altogether. Now, for instance, instead of sipping a 
thimbleful of port and complaining of the headache, she tossed off a tumbler of Chianti 
and slept the sounder. There was a flowering branch of oranges on the dinner-table 
instead of one denuded, sour, yellow fruit. Then instead of driving in a barouche 
landau to Regent's Park she pulled on her thick boots and scrambled over rocks. 
Instead of sitting in a carriage and rumbling along Oxford Street, they rattled off in a 
ramshackle fly to the borders of a lake and looked at mountains; and when she was 
tired she did not hail another cab; she sat on a stone and watched the lizards. She 
delighted in the sun; she delighted in the cold. (75) 
 
Italy is a world where there are “no fathers” (78), the rooms are empty and spacious 
(“He had never been in a room - if this were indeed a room - that was so hard, so 
                                                 
29 Ryan, Virginia Woolf and the Materiality of Theory, 151. 
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bright, so big, so empty” [73]), and there is no need for artifice and pretense 
(“Everything was itself and not another thing” [79]). Significantly, while in London it 
was mostly chicken and mutton that Flush fed upon, in Italy he switches to the diet of 
cheese and grapes: “He devoured whole bunches of ripe grapes largely because of their 
purple smell; he chewed and spat out whatever tough relic of goat or macaroni the 
Italian housewife had thrown from the balcony – goat and macaroni were raucous 
smells, crimson smells” (87), “The peasant women in the marketplace made him a bed 
of leaves in the shadow of their baskets and tossed him a bunch of grapes now and 
then” (96), “She had often cuffed him for stealing a grape, or for some other 
misdemeanour” (103). Flush, thus, points towards the idea that all forms of oppression, 
domination and inequality are profoundly connected. Just as the tyranny in England 
contaminated all kinds of relationships and interactions, in Italy, the text suggests, 
freedom and equality are omnipresent.  
The idea of tyranny as the kind of danger that spreads across the whole 
spectrum of human relationships serves as the foundation for Woolf’s other works 
from the 1930s, most notably her long essay Three Guineas. Here, she draws parallels 
between tyrannical patriarchs and fascist dictators: “The whole iniquity of 
dictatorship, whether in Oxford or Cambridge, in Whitehall or Downing Street, against 
Jews or against women, in England, or in Germany, in Italy or in Spain is now apparent 
to you.”30 Flush, working on an interspecies level, makes the vicious circle of 
dictatorship even more inclusive. 
Therefore, Flush advances the idea that also forms the basis of Three Guineas 
the oppression that works on a private familial level also determines the way societies 
function on a global political level. However, here we have to resolve an apparent 
contradiction of Flush. While being fully aware of the fact that in 1930 Italy is already 
a fascist state, Woolf still portrays its way of life as alternative to that preferred in 
Britain, as a place where oppression does not exist. The answer to this is to be found 
in anti-anthropocentric project of the text. When the Brownings move to Italy, the 
novel seems to lose all interest in the life of the poets and focuses almost solely on 
Flush’s experiences. Except for the moment the baby is born, Flush becomes 
                                                 
30 Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas (London: The Hogarth Press: 1968) 101. 
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increasingly indifferent to changes and events in the lives of his humans. The text 
suggests the logic within which as the reader’s distance from the human increases, 
their chances to discover the historical motives for the rise of fascism diminish. In 
other words, Woolf seems to see fascism and the war that follows in its wake as 
something exclusively human. She suggests that much like animals can be useful in 
women’s struggle against patriarchy, humanity as such can find a way to improve itself 
if it improves its understanding of animality and accepts it as a source of inspiration 
for building a better society. This is why in Flush she contradicts the Western 
conceptualization of  animals as lacking something, as being (unlike a human being) 
incomplete, which ultimately implies that animal experience of the world is less rich 
than that of a human being. Woolf is willing to contest this idea firstly by portraying 
Flush’s experience as infinitely more rich and diverse than that of his human 
companions; and secondly, by undermining language and reason-based superiority of 
the human.  
As to the richness of experience, the olfactory reality that is lived by Flush is 
portrayed in a manner that is supposed to make the reader envious of the impressions 
that are available to the canine protagonist: 
Mr. Browning wrote regularly in one room; Mrs. Browning wrote regularly in another. 
The baby played in the nursery. But Flush wandered off into the streets of Florence to 
enjoy the rapture of smell. He threaded his path through main streets and back streets, 
through squares and alleys, by smell. He nosed his way from smell to smell; the rough, 
the smooth, the dark, the golden. He went in and out, up and down, where they beat 
brass, where they bake bread, where the women sit combing their hair, where the bird-
cages are piled high on the causeway, where the wine spills itself in dark red stains on 
the pavement, where leather smells and harness and garlic, where cloth is beaten, 
where vine leaves tremble where men sit and drink and spit and dice--he ran in and 
out, always with his nose to the ground, drinking in the essence; or with his nose in 
the air vibrating with the aroma. He slept in this hot patch of sun--how sun made the 
stone reek! he sought that tunnel of shade--how acid shade made the stone smell! (86-
87) 
 
The quote juxtaposes writing in seclusion with Flush’s olfactory explorations and 
presents the latter as infinitely more exciting. Within this juxtaposition, language, the 
ultimate privilege and the border that separates the animal from the human elevating 
the latter and denouncing the former, becomes an affliction, something that stands in 
the way of the unmediated experience of the world. That Flush is defined in terms of 
excess rather than lack is further emphasized by the spectrum of sensations available 
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to him. Although the smell is established as his primary mode of interacting with 
reality, his vision is by no means portrayed as deficient. Maggie Hum in her essay 
“Virginia Woolf and Visual Culture” for The Cambridge Companion to Virginia 
Woolf points out how the visual for Flush is not less important that the olfactory.31 She 
points out that Flush gains the first sense of his individual subjectivity not through 
smell, but by witnessing himself in a mirror.32 Moreover, apart from the refined sense 
of smell and adequate sight Flush is able to experience the world in one more way that 
is largely inaccessible to humans: 
Nor was his sense of touch much less acute. He knew Florence in its marmoreal 
smoothness and in its gritty and cobbled roughness. Hoary folds of drapery, smooth 
fingers and feet of stone received the lick of his tongue, the quiver of his shivering 
snout. Upon the infinitely sensitive pads of his feet he took the clear stamp of proud 
Latin inscriptions. In short, he knew Florence as no human being has ever known it. 
(87) 
 
Flush’s tactile sensitivity, therefore, further contribute to his excessive appreciation of 
the world. By juxtaposing “infinitely sensitive pads” with “proud Latin inscriptions” 
Woolf draws attention to the deficiency of human understanding predicated upon the 
abstract system of language as well as to human pride that prevents any recognition of 
this deficiency. 
The question of human language is given special attention in the text. After all, 
it is a biography of a writer’s dog. Language remains the most important argument in 
establishing the human-animal hierarchy. Referring to Heidegger and Benjamin in 
“The Animal That Therefore I Am” Derrida notices that while the animal’s deprivation 
is manifold, the most important element that the animal finds itself always lacking, at 
least from the human point of view, is language.33 The narrator of Flush, however, 
seems skeptical about language: “But suppose Flush had been able to speak--would he 
not have said something sensible about the potato disease in Ireland?” (27). This 
sentence implies that language would change Flush completely replacing his unique 
sensibility with human reason. Had Flush been a man (and here gender is important as 
                                                 
31 Maggie Humm, “Virginia Woolf and Visual Culture,” The Cambridge Companion to Virginia Woolf, 
ed. Susan Sellers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 215. 
32 Maggie Humm, “Virginia Woolf and Visual Culture,” 220. 
33 Jacques Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” trans. David Wills, Critical 
Inquiry Vol. 28, 2002: 388. 
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Woolf seems to be aiming her irony at a stereotypical conceptualization of men as 
more rational and sensible), he would have ignored the immediate reality of his love 
for Miss Barrett and would have hidden behind abstract attempts to explain away the 
tragedy that had been taking place in Ireland. 
The key to Flush’s relationship with Miss Barrett is not their similarity but their 
difference: “The fact was that they could not communicate with words, and it was a 
fact that led undoubtedly to much misunderstanding. Yet did it not lead also to a 
peculiar intimacy?” (27) Eventually, even the poet herself starts feeling skeptical about 
language: “‘Writing,’ – Miss Barrett once exclaimed after a morning's toil, ‘writing, 
writing . . .’ After all, she may have thought, do words say everything? Can words say 
anything? Do not words destroy the symbol that lies beyond the reach of words?” (27). 
The uniqueness if not superiority of Flush’s wordless reality is further emphasized 
towards the end of the fifth chapter: “Not a single one of his myriad sensations ever 
submitted itself to the deformity of words” (87). 
Nevertheless, there is one moment in the novel when Flush is indeed longing 
for the ability to use language: 
So, too, Flush felt strange stirrings at work within him. When he saw Miss Barrett's 
thin hands delicately lifting some silver box or pearl ornament from the ringed table, 
his own furry paws seemed to contract and he longed that they should fine themselves 
to ten separate fingers. When he heard her low voice syllabling innumerable sounds, 
he longed for the day when his own rough roar would issue like hers in the little simple 
sounds that had such mysterious meaning. And when he watched the same fingers 
forever crossing a white page with a straight stick, he longed for the time when he too 
should blacken paper as she did. (43) 
 
It is important, however, that this passage comes immediately after the love scene 
between Flush and Miss Barrett and rather than signifying a profound lack in Flush’s 
nature it points towards his desire to become even closer to Miss Barret and eliminate 
all defects in their understanding. Flush’s longing for language is a part of the 
unbalanced relationship that they share, the relationship that forces him to sacrifice his 
freedom and change his whole nature. In order to become Miss Barrett’s companion 
he has to stop being a dog, or be less of a dog and acquiring human language would 
be a big step in this direction. Flush is swept out by the humanizing effect that London 
is having on him. Language, just like racism, aristocratic arrogance and agonizing 
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discipline, is an inherent part Flush’s becoming-human in London. The need for all of 
this will disappear in Italy once he is allowed to be a dog again.  
Freed from London’s propensity to civilize or humanize, Flush becomes 
increasingly suspicious of language and human ways as such. This is best exemplified 
by the scene on the balcony when the Brownings watch thousands of people marching 
the streets of Florence to thank Leopold II and cannot help feeling the excitement of 
the occasion. Flush, on the other hand, finds the demonstration rather absurd. The 
narrator, trying to guess at his thoughts and to interpret his yawn, says: “Who was this 
Grand Duke and what had he promised? Why were they all so absurdly excited? –  for 
the ardour of Mrs. Browning, waving and waving, as the banners passed, somehow 
annoyed him. Such enthusiasm for a Grand Duke was exaggerated, he felt” (80). It is 
significant that the demonstration, Flush senses, is a linguistic event where words are 
made visible on the banners and the articulation of promises, which he prophetically 
feels to be empty, takes place. To all this he prefers something quite different: “While 
she had found an inexplicable satisfaction in the trampling of forty thousand people, 
in the promises of Grand Dukes and the windy aspirations of banners, Flush infinitely 
preferred the little dog at the door” (81). Italy, where Flush is able to lead an existence 
free of the constraints of human notions of propriety and aristocracy, weakens the 
connection between him and Mrs. Browning and liberates him from any envy of 
human language. 
This is a scene that contains a more or less clear allusion to fascism whose 
spreading influence in Europe became associated with big gatherings of people in 
support of an authoritarian leader. While “Mr. and Mrs. Browning stood with six 
candles burning on the balcony, waving and waving” (81) without, it seems, any real 
understanding of what it is exactly that they are supporting, Flush feels the sinister 
potential of the event: “A weariness, a doubt, a ribaldry possessed him” (81) and makes 
the decision not to be part of it. With his disbelief in the language of banners and his 
refusal to cheer an abstract Grand Duke that can in time turn into Il Duce, Flush 
becomes the only presence in the novel who can already feel the danger that is soon to 
sweep across Europe. Unfortunately, the message Flush’s reaction to the march is 
carrying is overlooked by the people around him. The beginning of the next paragraph 
informs us: “It cannot be doubted that Mrs. Browning and Flush were reaching 
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different conclusions in their voyages of discovery” (81), and indeed, in Italy Flush 
learns to overlook all superficial differences between dogs and live freely, while the 
Brownings cannot fully reject the oppression-based system as they are not able to 
recognize the Grand Duke, an authoritative figure of male power, as an element of this 
system.  
Flush is, therefore, a novel that carries an anti-fascist message. Yet, this 
message can be fully discovered only through the consideration of the animal in the 
novel and the ways it is represented and conceptualized. Although thoroughly 
anthropomorphized, Flush the dog embodies otherness and is meant to remind the 
reader about other-than-human modes of experiencing the world. The novels also 
exposes human society as contaminated by countless forms oppression and implies 
that it is through interaction with animality and, therefore, through rethinking of the 
very opposition between the human and the animal that the vicious circle of oppression 




4. “A Stop the Mind Makes Between Uncertainties:”  
Post-Humanist Subjectivity in Nightwood 
Nightwood is another novel from the interwar period. Much like Flush, it 
contends that the old system of meaning as well as the narratives supporting it had lost 
their balance and cohesion. It constitutes an attempt to provide a new system of 
coordinates by which humanity can navigate itself and, hopefully, avoid stumbling 
upon another deadly conflict. It also sees the animal as an agency through which such 
a system can be discovered. Simultaneously, however, Barnes’s take on animality 
differs dramatically from that of Virginia Woolf. While Woolf humanizes a dog in 
order to make his diverse experience of the world accessible to humans so they can 
embrace this diversity and learn from it, Barnes animalizes her protagonist to envisage 
a new type of subjectivity. In order to do so, Barnes employs the idea of degeneration 
but only to undermine it dramatically. If typically the animal is seen as the feared 
endpoint of degeneration, in Nightwood it becomes excluded from the very logic of 
progress or regress becoming instead the beginning and the foundation of entirely new 
subjectivity.  
Nightwood is a text that can be described as a “night book,”1 a sibling of the 
ultimate “night book” published in 1939 – James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake. The novel 
is an excursion into darkness not only in the sense that for the most part its events take 
place at night, but also because it constitutes a withdrawal from rationality.2 Indeed, it 
is even emphasized in the title that the world of the novel is a night world of 
possibilities not limited by the linear logic of the day, a world of dreamlike openness 
populated by ideas and sensations usually censored by rationality.3 Nightwood is a 
novel where the night stands in opposition to the day and represents everything that 
has been repressed, from the center to the fringes, in order to create an illusion of 
cohesion and constancy. As Western subjectivity has been constructed through the 
abjection and repression of animality, it is not surprising that the animal becomes the 
                                                 
1 Richard Ellmann, James Joyce (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) 546.  
2 Catherine Whitley, “Nations and the Night: Excremental History in James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake 
and Djuna Barnes’ Nightwood,” Journal of Modern Literature, Fall 2000: 83. 
3 Whitley, “Nations and the Night,” 85. 
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central presence in the night of the text and the catalyst for one of the worst fears of 
the epoch – the fear of degeneration. 
Indeed, many critics have noticed that Nightwood can be interpreted as a 
“degeneration narrative”4 informed by the sociobiological concepts of social 
Darwinism and natural selection.5 Social Darwinism is based on the ideas of progress 
and the necessity of moving up the evolutionary ladder but in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries as Herbert Spenser’s ideas grew in popularity, there emerged 
the discourse of regress and degeneration, an unwanted but powerful shadow of social 
Darwinism. “If we could evolve as a culture, could we not also degenerate?” – this is 
the question that all the degeneration narratives share in their fear of cultural 
deterioration.6 The motifs of degeneration are abundant in Nightwood. The text is 
haunted by images of downward movement. The title of the first chapter of the novel 
is “Bow Down” and the central images of the last chapter, “The Possessed”, are those 
of Nora’s falling unconscious and of Robin’s walking on all fours: “at the moment 
Nora’s body struck the wood, Robin began going down.”7 The chapter that casts the 
last glance at doctor Matthew O’Connor is entitled “Go Down, Matthew” and the one 
that concludes Baron Felix’s story is called “Where the Tree Falls”. The most 
noticeable instance of regress in the novel is Robin’s8 gradual degeneration into an 
animal throughout the text of the novel with the culmination of this process happening 
in the last chapter when she starts crawling on all fours and according to some 
interpretations engages in an act of bestiality.9 However, in order to understand the 
meaning of Robin’s regress it is important to take into account the complicated 
structure that the novel builds around the motif of degeneration. 
                                                 
4 Dana Seitler, “Down on All Fours: Atavistic Perversions and the Science of Desire from Frank Norris 
to Djuna Barnes,” American Literature, Vol. 73, September 2001: 526. 
5 Seitler, “Down on All Fours,” 527. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Djuna Barnes, Nightwood (London: Faber&Faber, 2015) 152. All future page references will be to 
this edition and will be included in parentheses in the text. 
8 Robin carries a bird’s name which in the novel fulfils a double function. On the one hand, it refers 
to Robin’s unstable personality and the fleeting nature of her attachments thus confirming the 
symbolism usually attached to birds in culture; on the other hand, the novel resists this symbolism 
by portraying Robin as a bird who is not drawn to the sky, but rather to the earth, never going up, 
but repeatedly and insistently going down.  
9 Juliana Schiesari, Polymorphous Domesticities: Pets, Bodies, and Desire in Four Modern Writers 
(Berkley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 2012) 48.  
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If Robin is the one who becomes associated with degeneration and is sliding 
down into the feared animal state, Baron Felix is the character who fights the 
downward drift of the novel and instead tries to achieve perfect stability. While all the 
other protagonists of Nightwood find themselves in a space “bounded on the one side 
by the church and on the other by the court” (26) but not fully included by any of these 
powerful authorities, always moving in the margins of law and religion, Baron Felix 
is the one who “wishes to be correct at any moment” (9), to conform to every 
convention and to show respect to every authority. This is best expressed in his 
“obsession for what he termed ‘Old Europe’: aristocracy, nobility, royalty” (8). Felix 
constantly needs to pay homage to “the great past” (8) and therefore he bows “slightly 
to anyone who looked as if he might be ‘someone’” (9). His whole life is arranged 
around his obsession with the great names of history: “His rooms were taken because 
a Bourbon had been carried from them to death. He kept a valet and a cook; the one 
because he looked like Louis the Fourteenth and the other because she resembled 
Queen Victoria” (9). Thus, in the text the Baron poses as a conscious member of the 
traditional order, the one that had led to the First World War and the one that the novel 
ultimately ventures to criticize. The relationship that the text builds between the Baron 
and the animal is crucial as it indicates that the system Felix represents is predicated 
upon exploitation and subjugation. Early in the text, the Baron is compared to a dog: 
“he knew figures as a dog knows the covey and as indefatigably he pointed and ran” 
(7). This quote not only points out Felix’s connection to rationality by portraying him 
as a skilled mathematician, but it also relates him to a specific kind of animal – a 
trained dog, an animal that has been taught how to serve humans, a slave and 
simultaneously a symbol of human superiority. Another example comes later in the 
text when the reader is given the reason for Felix’s fondness for the circus – “that 
sweat-tarnished spangled enigma that, in bringing the beast to heel, had somehow 
turned toward him a face like his own” (10). Here again, the relationship of control 
and subjection become defining of Felix’s relationship with animality.  
However, animals are not the only ones who are being subjugated within the 
system that Felix is trying his best to protect and perpetuate. This system is also strictly 
patriarchal. In the novel, Felix becomes the perfect symbol of traditional patriarchy 
when he admits that for him the ultimate purpose of any marriage is the birth of a male 
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heir. When the doctor asks him whether he intends to get married the Baron says that 
he does as “he wished a son who would feel as he felt about the ‘great past’” (35). 
Given that a patriarchal system is “rendered powerful through bodies that are ‘purely’ 
bred”10 and because it values birthrights as cultural capital, it is entirely dedicated to 
producing heirs who then would be brought up in a certain manner (in a family) to 
perform their function in the ever-running mechanism of the establishment and thus 
would ensure the perseverance of the existing system of power relations. Within this 
system, a woman is merely a breeding machine who is valued mostly for her 
reproductive function, which is precisely the sentiment that is expressed in Felix’s 
answer to the doctor.  
In the novel, Robin embodies a revolt against the old patriarchal system Felix 
is trying to preserve as well as an alternative path, a chance at reform. She is not only 
a wild beast that refuses to be domesticated, but also a woman who refuses to submit 
to the patriarchal law. Indeed, every time Robin’s animality is emphasized in the text, 
her femininity is accentuated too: “Sometimes one meets a woman who is beast 
turning human” (33) or “Robin was outside the ‘human type’—a wild thing caught in 
a woman’s skin” (131). In Nightwood, having given birth to a boy, Robin feels that 
she has been exploited: “As he came toward her she said in a furry, ‘I didn’t want 
him!’ Raising her hand she struck him across the face” (44). Subsequently, she leaves 
her husband forever – something Felix is never able to recover from, because by his 
standards this act constitutes an awful crime. By containing an animal and a woman, 
the character of Robin unites the two in their struggle against the old system 
(something that has already been foregrounded in Flush) that in the text is presented 
as defective and destructive.  
Nightwood is a narrative of fallen penises (another downward movement) and 
dead children. Impotence haunts the novel. Count Onatorio Alamonte, the first 
nobleman that Felix meets, “suspected that he had come upon his last erection”(23), 
later we witness doctor Matthew’s unsuccessful attempt to masturbate when in spite 
of all his efforts “Tiny O’Toole11 was lying in a swoon” (119). Moreover, in the middle 
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of the novel there comes an elaborate curse of erection:12 “May you die standing 
upright! May you be damned upward! May this be damned, terrible and damned spot! 
May it wither into the grin of the dead, may this draw back, low riding mouth in an 
empty snarl of the groin!” (85). An erect penis, the main symbol of patriarchy, in 
Nightwood is also a signifier of order and uprightness13 and the haunting presence of 
impotence is an indication that the patriarchy has failed and the system is not working 
anymore. Another indication of the collapse of the patriarchy is the grim fate the 
children suffer in Nightwood. In some cases they die, like the tenor’s son in Matthew’s 
story. The boy is bitten by a rat and although his father wants to spend every living 
moment with his sick child, he leaves to perform his duty to society:  
But did he leave his bedside for a moment? He did because, though the son was sick, 
the fleet was in. But being a father, he prayed as he drank the champagne; and he 
wished his son alive as he chucked over the compass and invited the crew home, bow 
and spirit. But when he got home the little son lay dead. (120) 
 
 In this case, the demands that the system places upon the father result in his son’s 
dying alone. Other times in Nightwood children do not die but become exploited by 
the system. When Count Onatorio Alamonte comes upon his last erection, it is a young 
girl who, in absolute silence and not given much attention by neither the guests of the 
ball nor even the narrator, has to stay with the count and be the object of this last 
erection (22). Guido, a sick boy born of Robin and Felix’s unfortunate union, is 
exploited in a different manner. First, before he is even born, he becomes a victim on 
whom Felix puts the burden of his unfulfilled dreams and ambitions. Later, when Felix 
brings himself to accept the boy’s decision to enter the church and thus never to have 
offspring, which would effectively end Felix’s bloodline, he starts to deteriorate: “in 
accepting his son the Baron saw that he must accept a demolition” (97). Therefore, the 
boy is doomed to a life with a miserable, disappointed father, an unhappy existence 
that is best summarized at the end of “Where the Tree Falls”:  
Many cafés saw this odd trio, the child in the midst wearing heavy lenses that made 
his eyes drift forward, sitting erect, his neck holding his head at attention, watching 
his father ’s coins roll, as the night drew out, farther and farther across the floor and 
under the feet of the musicians as Felix called for military music, for Wacht am Rhein, 
                                                 
12 Jane Marcus, “Laughing at Leviticus: Nightwood as Woman’s Circus Epic,” Cultural Critique, 
Autumn 1989: 171. 
13 Marcus, “Laughing at Leviticus,” 161.  
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for Morgenrot, for Wagner; his monocle dimmed by the heat of the room, perfectly 
correct and drunk. (110) 
 
Just as the doctor predicts in the first chapter, Felix becomes an alcoholic. He also 
gives up his career in the bank and ends up being life-partners with a sexless circus 
acrobat whom he previously regarded as one of the “gaudy, cheap cuts from the beast 
life, immensely capable of that great disquiet called entertainment” (10). Felix 
deteriorates by his own standards but even finding himself at the very bottom of the 
hierarchy that he has forced upon himself, he refuses to doubt it. The last time Felix is 
mentioned in the novel he thinks he sees the Grand Duke Alexander of Russia and he 
cannot stop himself from making “a slight bow” (110-111). It is at this point that he is 
compared to an animal, but this time not to a proud servant of humanity, but an animal 
who is ashamed of the human ways: “his head in his confusion making a complete 
half-swing, as an animal will turn its head away from a human, as if in mortal shame” 
(111). However, this quote also reveals that there is still hope for Felix. While his bow 
is a gesture of his final submission to the idea of nobility, his transformation into an 
animal who is ashamed of a human is an indication of the possibility that he has at 
least partly realized the emptiness of his beliefs in pure and superior humanity.  
Thus, as the narrative develops, Felix is transformed from a symbol of an 
outdated patriarchal system into a symbol of degradation. Robin, on the other hand, 
provides a counterpoint to this system. If Felix stands for purity and uniformity, Robin 
signifies inclusion and hybridity. Animality and femininity in her character do not only 
form an alliance against the demands and restrictions of patriarchy, they also prefigure 
a fundamentally new type of sexuality. It resists the kind of Oedipalized sexuality that 
is predicated upon reproductive function. Rather, it envisages the notion of sexuality 
as an alliance discussed in Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus. In their work 
the philosophers see heterosexual normativity, the institution of family and most of all 
the Oedipal organization of society (the kind of organization in which all human 
interaction is predicated upon the Oedipal triangle of a father, a mother and a child) as 
a “rock on which Man has chosen to take his stand.”14 Deleuze and Guattari as well as 
                                                 
14 Michel Foucault, Preface, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000) xvi. 
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Barnes see this rock as something that lies in the way of humanity’s neurosis-free well-
being and blocks the possibility of experiencing this world in a more complete and 
authentic manner. Deleuze and Guattari's approach to sexuality is based on the new 
understanding of the body: “A body is not defined by the form that determines it nor 
as a determinate substance or subject nor by the organs it possesses or the functions it 
fulfils.”15 They connect the view of the body as a biological machine with fixed 
functions and possibilities to the ideology of the Western State16 that seeks to program 
a body in a certain way in order to achieve its goals. Essentially, they insist that being 
a biologically and medically defined body today in Western capitalism “means that 
your organs are Oedipally patterned for hetero-marriage and work.”17 The body is 
stolen from us “in order to fabricate opposite organisms”18 and thus its potential is 
severely restricted. To escape the Oedipal understanding of the body one has to let go 
of the stability provided by the ready-made ideas about it.  
In Nightwood we notice very similar logic. First of all, by placing only women 
at the corners of the love triangle Barnes rejects the gender-defined idea of love and 
makes it clear that the relationship that people choose to engage in should not be 
defined by what we have between “the one leg and the other” (126). Simultaneously, 
the novel demonstrates that although gender and the system it informs are superficial 
they are still very powerful. In Nightwood, the character of Nora is emblematic of this 
danger. As a lesbian, Nora is ostensibly free from the Oedipal structure, but she still 
remains bound by it, doomed to play the role of a caring mother/wife. In the novel, 
Nora becomes associated with family, religion and traditional values. The house she 
                                                 
15 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005) 260. 
16 In The History of Sexuality Foucault suggests that since the 17th century, when the discourses on 
sexual practices started to proliferate in Europe, sexuality became inextricably linked to reproduction: 
“For was this transformation of sex into discourse not governed by the endeavor to expel from reality 
the forms of sexuality that were not amenable to the strict economy of reproduction: to say no to 
unproductive activities,  to banish casual pleasures, to reduce or exclude practices whose object was 
not procreation?” (36). The strict economy of reproduction has as its goal to ensure the perseverance 
of the existing system of power relations that is still largely based on the patriarchal model: there has 
to be an heir that would be brought up in a certain manner (in a family) to perform their function in 
the ever-running mechanism of the State. 
17 John Protevi, “Deleuze and Life,” The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze, ed. Daniel W. Smith 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 260. 
18 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 276. 
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lives in “had been in the family two hundred years” (45) and “by temperament Nora 
was an early Christian; she believed in the word” (46). Although outwardly Nora 
overcomes the gender binary in choosing a female lover for herself, she still remains 
deeply rooted in it throughout the novel, as a typical mother/wife, she seeks to restrict 
Robin’s wanderings  and to confine her to family structure and to the gender-defined 
role-distribution inherent in it: “Out looking for what she’s afraid to find – Robin. 
There goes mother of mischief, running about, trying to get the world home” (55). 
Throughout Nightwood Nora remains a woman in the patriarchal sense of this word, 
unable to liberate herself from the constructed femininity and Oedipal compulsions. 
She, therefore, finds herself in a conundrum. On the one hand, it is on this model that 
she bases her idea of happiness and it is within this model that she tries to imprison 
Robin. On the other hand, as a lesbian she cannot fulfil the main condition that this 
model imposes – she cannot have a child: “We give death to a child when we give it a 
doll it’s the effigy and the shroud; when a woman gives it to a woman, it is the life 
they cannot have, it is their child, sacred and profane; so when I saw that other doll” 
(128). Thus, Nora is caught within the symbolic economy of Oedipal family and 
reproductive sexuality that it presupposes. Although Nora does sustain a certain 
relationship with animality, as she has a dog, this relationship fails to help her. Before 
Nora’s dog enters the relationship of “unnatural participation”19 with Robin, he 
remains what Deleuze and Guattari call an “Oedipal animal”20 – an animal devoid of 
its revolutionary potential to “uproot one from humanity,”21 which necessarily means 
abandoning socially imposed formulas. Before the scene in the chapel Nora’s dog is a 
well-behaved domesticated animal who is fully integrated into the normal life of 
society: “… sitting about her oak table before the huge fire, Nora listening, her hand 
on her hound, the firelight throwing her shadow and his high against the wall” (45). 
This immobilized animality whose shadow becomes a part of a familiar home is 
opposed to Robin’s animality that is always moving unable to stay in one place. 
In Nightwood, Robin is not just an animal, but an animal that “[knows] herself 
astray” (52). Robin, in other words, is a wild animal who cannot be domesticated, who 
                                                 
19 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 285. 
20 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 233. 
21 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 265. 
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cannot bear to be kept: “Robin was outside the ‘human type’ – a wild thing caught in 
a woman’s skin” (131). She is always moving somewhere, “wandering without 
design” (150). Even her thoughts are “a form of locomotion” (54). When Robin meets 
Nora for the first time they are in a circus and Robin seems to have no clue as to why 
she is there: “‘I don’t want to be here!’ But it was all she said; she did not explain 
where she wished to be” (49). This feeling of being lost never leaves Robin; she is an 
aimless “traveler” (51) in the world who does not know where she is going. Moreover, 
Robin’s wanderings are nearly always sexually charged: “Every bed she leaves, 
without caring, fills her heart with peace and happiness” (132). Robin is unable to 
sustain any stable relationship, throughout the novel she is wandering from partner to 
partner. Jeanette Winterson confidently connects Robin’s wonderings to sexual 
promiscuity: “Seedy Paris of whores and cheap bars has not yet begun to change. It is 
to this world that Robin Vote is drawn; the night-time world, where she will not be 
judged, and where she can find the anonymity of a stranger’s embrace.”22 And indeed 
Robin is indirectly compared to a whore when Nora hears her singing: “[Nora] knew 
that Robin was singing of a life that she herself had no part in; snatches of harmony as 
tell-tale as the possessions of a traveller from a foreign land; songs like a practised 
whore who turns away from no one but the one who loves her” (51). Robin’s 
promiscuity effectively puts her outside the Oedipal triangle and its constraints. 
Instead, she represents the type of sexuality envisioned by Deleuze and Guattari: 
“there is a circulation of impersonal affects, an alternate current that disrupts 
signifying projects as well as subjective feelings, and constitutes a nonhuman 
sexuality.”23 In A Thousand Plateaus, sexuality becomes one of the movements of 
“becoming”. This becoming, possibly one of the most complicated concepts in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, is inextricably connected to the interaction with 
animality. It is through becoming-animal that our body receives a chance to uproot the 
organs from their specificity and acquire an absolutely new experience of living: “I 
must succeed in endowing the parts of my body with relations of speed and slowness 
that will make it become dog, in an original assemblage proceeding neither by 
                                                 
22 Jeanette Winterson, Preface, Nightwood (New York: New Directions, 2006) xi. 
23 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 233. 
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resemblance nor by analogy.”24 While becoming cannot proceed by resemblance or 
analogy, it proceeds by making alliances with sexuality as the dominant power in this 
process as “a power of alliance inspiring illicit unions or abominable lovers.”25 This is 
precisely what happens in the last chapter of Nightwood where Robin makes her 
sexually charged alliance with a dog. It is important to point out that it is with Nora’s 
dog that the alliance is formed. Although before the dog was only mentioned in the 
text as a representative of Oedipalized animality devoid of any revolutionary potential, 
in “The Possessed” he undergoes a transformation which undermines the very 
opposition between wild and domestic animals. This transformation is initiated and 
achieved through Robin who, crawling on all fours, invites the dog to participate in 
“something that troubled him” (153), pressing him against the wall until he is backed 
“into the farthest corner” (153). Only then does the dog stop being a compliant 
domesticated creature and attacks Robin. After this uprooting of the animal from his 
Oedipalized disposition is accomplished, the alliance can be made and both start 
running “head to head” (153). This alliance is not an alliance of sentimental friendship 
or love. Rather it is an agreement between two powers that gives both of them an 
impulse needed for a transformation to happen as both Robin and the dog undergo a 
change in this last chapter. It is of outmost importance that Nora, for whom Robin was 
searching, faints as soon as she sees Robin, making any kind of exchange impossible 
between the two. Nora’s rigid identity based on her inflexible beliefs and ideals 
prevents her from making an alliance with the other and therefore in the last chapter 
she is substituted for a dog who turns out to be more capable of transformation. 
Therefore, “The Possessed” summarizes Robin’s relationship with animality and 
emphasizes hybridity that becomes accessible through interaction with it.  
In the novel, this hybridity becomes the foundation of a new post-humanist 
identity. Within this identity, animality is transformed from the feared endpoint of the 
degeneration process into an agency through which a new type of presence in the world 
can be developed. While Robin is the main representative of this new type of presence, 
its main features are theorized not by Robin but by other characters, chiefly by the 
                                                 
24 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 258. 
25 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 171. 
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most eloquent of the protagonists – doctor Matthew O’Connor. This is the result of the 
fact that Robin in the novel embodies the rejection of language and linguistic 
communication. This is evident in Robin’s multiple “linguistic refusals.”26 When she 
walks with Baron Felix around Paris “he felt that he could talk to her, tell her anything, 
though she herself was so silent” (37). When Nora looks at Robin she feels that her 
forehead speaks of “some awful silence” (52). Most of Nora and Robin’s interaction 
are silent and when Nora follows Robin to the cafes where she spends her wondering 
nights, Nora notices that she stands there “sometimes laughing, but more often silent” 
(44). Robin is an anonymous force (“in her gestures there was a desperate anonymity” 
[151] or “Two spirits were working in her, love and anonymity” [49]) a force, in other 
words, for which there is no word in any language. She is opposed to language because 
it seeks and imposes stability while she is conceptualized as an utterly unstable hybrid. 
Thus, the Baron describes her in the following manner: “I find that I never did have a 
really clear idea of her at any time. I had an image of her, but that is not the same thing. 
An image is a stop the mind makes between uncertainties” (100). The doctor, on the 
other hand, is the one whose monologues constitute two thirds of the novel. As he puts 
it himself: “I’ve given my destiny away by garrulity” (81). However, the doctor is also 
the main critic and the main prosecutor of language in the novel. He recognizes 
language as a system that separates us from the phenomena of the real world and 
ultimately reduces this world, forcing it into abstract formulas: “Yes, we who are full 
to the gorge with misery should look well around, doubting everything seen, done, 
spoken, precisely because we have a word for it, and not its alchemy” (75). Also, 
Matthew criticizes Nora for her reliance on language and the categories it imposes: 
“There is no truth, and you have set it between you; you have been unwise enough to 
make a formula; you have dressed the unknowable in the garments of the known” 
(123). However, it is mainly through his monologues that Robin becomes a linguistic 
and philosophic presence and it is to him that Nora and Baron Felix come, in the futile 
attempt to comprehend the experience they shared with Robin. Therefore, the doctor’s 
relationship with language is of a contradictory nature. On the one hand, he uses it 
extensively to theorize about Robin and the night as such; on the other hand, he 
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understands the futility of any such attempt because Robin has moved above (or under) 
language. This is precisely what Matthew cannot accomplish himself. With all his 
insights into the nature of human subjectivity, he remains opposed to hybridity, which 
in the novel is predicated upon the rejection of linguistic formulas. This is evident in 
his inability to overcome the gender binary as well as in his relationship with 
animality. Although doctor does recognize the linguistically imposed nature of gender 
(“It’s a gruesome thing that man learns only by what he has between the one leg and 
the other! [...] You never know which one of your ends it is that is going to be the part 
you can’t take your mind off” [126]) he still remains torn between the masculine and 
the feminine. In the novel, he keeps regretting the fact that he was born a man. In 
“Watchman, what of the Night” he wonders: “...am I to blame if I’ve turned up this 
time as I shouldn’t have been, when it was a high soprano I wanted, and deep corn 
curls to my bum, with a womb as big as the king’s kettle, and a bosom as high as the 
bowsprit of a fishing schooner?” (81). While the doctor longs for traditional 
femininity, Robin can effortlessly combine both genders. In the novel, she is a “girl 
who resembles a boy” and also someone who freely alternates female and male 
clothing (133, 152).  
The doctor’s relationship with animality has similar dynamics in that he cannot 
accept and combine both. Rather, he always remains on the human side of the binary 
unable to let go of language and the thinking process predicated upon it. This is best 
expressed in the story he tells Nora in “Go Down, Matthew” about Father Lucas 
instructing him “to be simple like the beasts in the field” (118) and yet think. Matthew 
finds this mission too hard to accomplish: “This is a terrible thing that Father Lucas 
has put on me – be simple like the beasts and yet think and harm nobody” (118). It is 
significant that in the anecdote animals feature as “simple” beasts as Matthew’s other 
stories concerned with animality also portray animals as simple, not in the sense that 
they are uncomplicated and knowable, but rather in the sense that they are innocent 
and not to blame for the cruelties and absurdities of the manmade world. The first story 
is told during the very first conversation Felix has with the doctor towards the end of 
“Bow Down”. It takes place during the war and is concerned with a cow who shares a 
cellar with people hiding from a wave of bombing. The doctor treats the animal in a 
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very sentimental manner expressing much concern and compassion in both his actions 
and his language:  
At that a flash of lightning went by and I saw the cow turning her head straight back 
so her horns made two moons against her shoulders, the tears soused all over her great 
black eyes. ‘I began talking to her, cursing myself and the mick, and the old woman 
looking as if she were looking down her life [...]. I put my hand on the poor bitch of a 
cow and her hide was running water under my hand [...]; and I thought, there are 
directions and speeds that no one has calculated, for believe it or not that cow had 
gone somewhere very fast that we didn’t know of, and yet was still standing there. 
(20) 
 
The cow in the story is not an uncomplicated creature as the doctor recognizes that the 
animal might know more about the world than we do, but the cow is innocent because 
the story puts her in the context of the war, a disaster for which only humans can be 
blamed, and portrays the animal as an innocent and helpless victim. Significantly, 
Matthew's other animal anecdote is very similar in setting to this one. This story is told 
to Felix in “Where the Tree Falls”: 
Take the case of the horse who knew too much,” said the doctor, “looking between 
the branches in the morning, cypress or hemlock. She was in mourning for something 
taken away from her in a bombardment in the war—by the way she stood, that 
something lay between her hooves – she stirred no branch, though her hide was a river 
of sorrow… (102) 
 
Here, the animal is again the ultimate and affecting victim of a disaster brought about 
by people. Although the horse and the cow are pitied and recognized as someone who 
can experience pain and suffering, they are not viewed as independent agencies 
capable of generating change and development. Rather, they are passive beings who 
are always at people’s mercy. Thus, the animality that the doctor keeps alluding to is 
impotent in the sense that just like Nora’s dog (before her interaction with Robin) it 
cannot initiate any alliances and result in any hybridity.  
Therefore, it is only Robin with her shifting identity who in the novel 
represents a new kind of post-humanist subjectivity. This subjectivity is characterized 
by utter instability and hybridity. Within Robin, binaries become meaningless as she 
melds together the human and the animal, the male and the female. Her rejection of 
language helps her attain anonymity and results in her “lack of identity.” However, 
Barnes does not portray this new subjectivity as a new goal for humanity. In other 
words, she undermines the idea of degeneration refusing to see the animal as the feared 
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endpoint of this process, but she also refuses to turn her novel into a progress narrative. 
Instead, Robin is conceptualized as an influence, the consequences of which cannot be 
known. She represents “something not yet in history” (40). She is both a figure of 
immortality (“she who is eaten death returning” [34]) and a “figure of doom” (37). 
What will come of the “obscene and touching” (153) union between a woman and a 
dog remains unexplored and unexplained, possibly because language just cannot be 




5. Looking for Animals in Brigid Brophy’s 
Hackenfeller’s Ape 
Hackenfeller’s Ape sets itself apart from the previous texts, as here for the first 
time the question of the animal constitutes the novel's central concern. While Ulysses, 
Flush and Nightwood do express interest in social and philosophical practices through 
which animality is constructed, it is still the human that they are ultimately concerned 
with and it is for the benefit of the human that they venture to undermine the human-
animal binary. Hackenfeller’s Ape, however, is different in that it expresses interest in 
animality for its own sake, insisting that the animal question presents valid moral and 
ethical concerns.    
Throughout her life, Brophy was outspoken in her condemnation of various 
kinds of animal abuse. She was a member of numerous animal welfare groups and 
delivered speeches advocating vegetarianism and addressing issues such as hunting, 
angling, vivisection and animal testing. Her most celebrated contribution to the cause 
is her 1965 article “The Rights of Animals” collected in the 1971 anthology Animals, 
Men and Morals. Without actually naming it, the article criticizes the logic of 
speciesism1 – the exclusion of animals from moral and ethical consideration based 
solely on their belonging to a different species and without concern for their mental 
and emotional capacities: “But where animals are concerned humanity seems to have 
switched off its morals and aesthetics [...]. Only in relation to the next animal can 
civilized humans persuade themselves that they have absolute and arbitrary rights - 
that they may do anything whatever that they can get away with.”2 The challenging of 
the logic of speciesism and human supremacy as such is also something that Brophy 
focuses on in her first novel Hackenfeller’s Ape.  
The critics of speciesism insist that “animal” is by no means a descriptive term, 
but rather a political one, and as such it presupposes a certain distribution of power. In 
other words, the term is not meant to describe who the animal other is or any of their 
                                                 
1 Interestingly, the term “speciesism” was first used by Richard D. Ryder in his essay “Experiments on 
Animals,” which was also published in Animals, Men and Morals.    
2 Brigid Brophy, “The Rights of Animals,” Don’t Never Forget: Collected Views and Reviews (London: 
Jonathan Cape Thirty Bedford Square, 1966) 16.  
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crucial characteristics, it only designates what we can do to this other. Regardless of 
the fact that “the traditionally distinctive marks of the human [first it was possession 
of a soul, then ‘reason’, then tool use, then tool making, then altruism, then language, 
then the production of linguistic novelty, and so on] flourish quite reliably beyond the 
species barrier,”3 the logic of speciesism allows relentless exploitation of the animal 
other solely on the basis of a “generic characteristic – in this case, species”4 and thus 
functions similarly to other -isms such as racism or sexism. In the first chapter of 
Hackenfeller’s Ape, Brophy draws our attention to the ideologically constructed nature 
of the species divide by humorously applying the type of discourse usually used to 
describe animals’ social practices to the human visitors of the London Zoo: “...the Park 
was alive with the murmuring vibration of the species which made it its preserve. The 
creatures, putting off timidity at the same time as winter drabness, abounded now with 
no ascertainable purpose except to sun themselves.”5 Parodying the discourse of nature 
documentaries, Brophy focuses on the same aspects these films tend to accentuate: 
“The ground, too hard to receive their spoors, shook beneath games that revealed a 
high degree of social organization” (11) or “On the gravel paths, scuffles and hoots 
gave evidence of courting rites” (11). It is only after this demonstration of the 
arbitrariness of the discourse of species that Brophy offers a serious comment on the 
animal question, making it harder for the reader to disagree with her: “This was, 
moreover, the only species which imprisoned other species not for any motive of 
economic parasitism but for the dispassionate parasitism of indulging its curiosity” 
(12). However, the text does not sustain this serious and accusative tone. The comic 
attitude returns with the next line that serves as another statement on human social 
organization: “That curiosity, however, was not to be indulged on Sunday before half-
past two” (12). With its ironic treatment of the discourse of species, the novel can be 
                                                 
3 Cary Wolfe, Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003) 2. 
4 Wolfe, Animal Rites, 1.  
5 Brigid Brophy, Hackenfeller’s Ape (London: Allison and Busby, 1979) 11. All future page references 
will be to this edition and will be included in parentheses in the text. 
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described as a comic satire6 that takes for its object the logic of speciesism as well as 
other attitudes and practices empowered by it.  
As part of this movement, the novel exposes the zoo as a space that not only 
epitomizes the ideology of speciesism, but also reinforces it. Zoos appeal to their 
visitors as tokens of a collective unconscious fantasy of Edenic perfection7 and 
position themselves as sites of scientific research and “an emblem of conservation 
policy.”8 However, the educational value of zoos is problematic. Historically, zoos 
have presented animals as “freaks, as objects divorced from nature, belittled, distorted, 
out of context.”9 Deprived of everything except their value as museum exhibits, these 
animals are also deprived of their complexity as beings. In the circumstances of a zoo, 
visitors cannot come into contact with animality; they cannot see and recognize 
animals as autonomous and complete beings whose existence is not defined or shaped 
by human indentations. Instead, the lesson that zoos teach their visitors is the lesson 
of human superiority. As Dale Jamieson puts it: “Zoos teach us a false sense of our 
place in the natural order.”10 Such a moment of teaching appears in the first chapter 
when a boy, a random visitor to the zoo, “his attention caught by the mournful aspect 
of the Hackenfeller’s Ape” (28), tries to feed a nut to the monkey. The boy’s dilemma 
is fully expressed in the passage a few lines later: “Still stretched over the barrier, he 
dared not to go inside. Percy’s sulkiness baffled and unsettled him, and he held himself 
ready to jerk away if the animal should prove dangerous” (29). He is overwhelmed by 
two emotions: fear and confusion. His fear is informed by the assumption that 
everything that belongs to the realm of nature, especially wild nature (as the boy 
perceives Percy as a wild animal) is dangerous to a human. This assumption is a result 
of the nature-culture dualism, which defines our understanding of the world. As Val 
Plumwood points out, within this dualistic framework “wilderness” becomes the 
                                                 
6 Elizabeth Maslen, Political and Social Issues in British Women’s Fiction, 1928-1968 (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) 55. 
7 Randy Malamud, Reading Zoos: Representations of Animals and Captivity (New York: Palgrave 
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10 Quoted in Malamud, Reading Zoos, 2. 
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underside of reason and civilization and as such, it is always alien and fearful.11 While 
the boy’s fear signifies his dependence on cultural stereotypes, his confusion is an act 
of independent thinking. Percy’s “mournful aspect” (28) is the very reason the boy 
notices the monkey and as he comes closer it is Percy’s “sulkiness” (28) that confuses 
him. The boy is thus disturbed by Percy’s unhappiness. It “baffles” (28) him because 
it does not fit in with the idea of a zoo inhabited by happy animals, the idea to which 
most children are exposed from an early age. This is a moment in the boy’s life when 
he is about to challenge the taught imperative and, through his own independent 
perception of the animal’s emotions, discover the inaccuracy of the ideologically 
imposed formulas which define the perceptions of zoos and their prisoners. However, 
this never happens as when he complains to his mother about Percy not wanting to 
take the offered nut, she replies: “Save it for one that does [want it]” (29). The mother’s 
reply presents Percy’s behavior as inappropriate. Instead of seeing the monkey’s 
sadness and passivity as the result of the emotional response animals have to captivity, 
she perceives him (and teaches her son to do the same) as a shameful anomaly that 
spoils her family’s visit to the zoo. Interestingly enough, the lesson that the mother is 
teaching to her son, is also the lesson she herself has just learned from her husband: 
“They don’t look very happy, do they?” 
“That’s just their expression.” 
“It doesn’t seem right to keep them shut up.” 
“They’re all right,” the man said. He refused to have his son’s pleasure spoilt, 
even though his son could not hear, by any suggestion that it was unkind. (28)  
 
This dialogue precedes the boy’s interaction with Percy by just a couple of lines. It 
thus becomes clear that while Brophy does see the zoo as a space within which the 
power of one species to rule over the other is manifested, she does not perceive it as 
completely devoid of the potential to unsettle our expectations and received opinions 
on animals.  
 The problem of teaching and transmitting certain patterns of thought is also 
present in Hackenfeller’s Ape’s exploration of the issue of pre-programmed and non-
autonomous ways of understanding animality. In the novel, it is best visible in the 
                                                 




characters of Gloria and Tom. At the very start of her first conversation with the 
Professor, Gloria says, “All these animals shut up. It does not seem right, really. I 
know they don’t really feel anything, animals” (71). Gloria here suppresses her 
sympathy for animals and prefers to rely on the received formula. Her dependence on 
such formulas is further emphasized in the passage where she daydreams about a date 
with a man. This daydream exposes her fantasies as determined by pop-culture’s 
stereotypical love narratives. The plot of this fantasy is a typical plot of a gangster 
movie and its hero is “a mixture of Burt Lancaster and Marlon Brando” (87). It is 
Gloria’s dependence on Hollywood narratives that makes Tom a hero in her eyes after 
he kills Percy. She is attracted by the image of a man holding a gun and a man who is 
brave enough to kill, even if it is just a helpless monkey who becomes the victim of 
this alleged bravery. Tom, in his turn, is also unable to perceive Percy outside the 
pattern he has learned as a child: 
He had been an evacuee. The country town where he stayed was bombed on three 
successive nights and, one Saturday afternoon, machine-gunned from the air. There 
had been, not only on the days of actual danger but for a year afterwards, an infectious 
spirit, almost a genius, of crisis. [...] This feeling returned now as he patrolled the zoo. 
The very shotgun he carried [...] provoked memory. His father had taught him how to 
use it - in case of parachutists. (100) 
  
Although initially Tom says to his supervisor that “Percy would not hurt a fly” (97) he 
ends up killing the monkey almost instinctively: “The joy of sharing a manly pursuit 
with his father came back; he remembered all the lessons and took aim with classic 
correctness” (101). In “And Say the Animal Responded?” Jacques Derrida sees this 
automatism of action and reaction as undermining the very border between the animal 
and the human. It has always been assumed, he points out, that the animal is an 
instinctual being and the human is defined by the ability to react independently and 
spontaneously. However, as Freud and Lacan has demonstrated, a fully self-present 
Cartesian subject is in fact a fiction. The unconscious “should prevent us having any 
immediate and conscious assurance of the freedom presupposed by any notion of 
responsibility” and “hence some automaticity of the reaction in every response.” 12 
Therefore, the very reaction that Tom and Gloria have towards animality shows their 
                                                 
12 Jacques Derrida, “And Say the Animal Responded?” Zoontologies: the Question of the Animal, ed. 
Cary Wolfe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003) 127. 
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dependence on subconscious automatism and undermines their difference from the 
animal.      
The only character who partly escapes this automatism of thinking about and 
interacting with animals is Professor Darrelhyde, a zoologist who regularly comes to 
the zoo hoping to see the monkeys’ mating ritual. As a scientist, he has been trained 
to treat his animal subjects in a certain manner, so when he first starts observing Percy 
he tries to practice an objective approach, which is predicated on excluding emotions 
and, in the case of animals, any ethical considerations: “The professional part of his 
mind observed that the animals were in good condition: not over-verminous; skin and 
eyes healthy in appearance. Evidently their diet and the space allotted to them were 
adequate” (18). The text conceptualizes this type of relationship as one-sided and 
unbalanced stating that when the professor thought of Percy’s imprisonment he “had 
for a long time hedged, declining to admit there was torment, refusing to stand in the 
receiving position of this enquiring relationship, disinvolving himself from the 
monkey’s affairs” (18). The scientific approach attempted by the Professor is 
described in Teresa Brennan’s book History after Lacan as “sadodispassionate.”13 She 
insists that “when directed towards another, the dispassionate merges readily with 
sadism in that it denies or cuts off empathy or identification with the other.”14 Indeed, 
the Professor’s main goal is to erase any possibility of empathy or identification from 
the scientific record of Hackenfeller’s apes’ mating rituals. While Hackenfeller’s 
account of the mating presented it as “a ceremonial so poetic, so apparently conscious 
that, if it were true, it must mark a stage between the highest beast and Man” (19), the 
Professor hopes “to replace the confused, anonymous, undated tradition, which had 
been preserved among untrained minds, by a couple of sentences packed and precisely 
descriptive” (19). Although initially determined not to commit pathetic fallacy and 
remain an objective observer, the Professor cannot help feeling emotional when he 
witnesses the drama that takes place between the monkeys, Percy and Edwina. Percy 
does not want to commit to reproduction in spite of being healthy and having just 
enough space in his cage (“The animal was healthy enough: why didn’t it do what it 
                                                 




was in its nature to do and at the same time benefit science?” [20]), and thus the 
problem appears to be emotional or psychological in nature, the two realms that the 
scientific framework denies animals. Thus, Darrelhyde realizes that the mating ritual 
does not take place for a reason that the scientific approach cannot be stretched to 
cover. Consequently, the Professor abandons it: “It was then that the Professor entered 
a relationship with the monkeys. At first, he simply crooned to Percy, because the 
sound soothed the pain - usually something from Figaro’s Marriage. Then he had 
begun to talk” (20). The moment the Professor starts talking to the monkey he crosses 
the species boundary and starts treating Percy as a human. He also, however, 
contributes to the novel’s comic effect. That Brophy portrays the relationship the 
Professor ends up establishing with the monkey as somewhat ludicrous and amusing 
to the reader (an old man spending hours in front of a monkey's cage talking to him 
and singing him Mozart’s arias) signifies the fact that this relationship is also 
inherently flawed – the issue that will be discussed later in the chapter.   
Another source of the comic in the text is Percy himself. Hackenfeller’s ape is 
an invention, it is “the missing link,”15 a creature that marks the transition between a 
human and an animal: “Working on specimens alive and dead, they had established 
that the eyesight of Hackenfeller’s Ape, and the composition, temperature and pressure 
of its blood, came closer to the human model than those of any other animal” (16). It 
is also for this reason that the Professor is so eager to jump the species barrier: he was 
already prepared by scientific research to recognize Percy as more human than other 
animals (by pointing out the fact that scientist worked on “specimens alive and dead” 
the quote emphasizes the irony of the fact that to be recognized as almost human the 
apes had to be treated as fully non-human, i.e. killed for no other reason than the 
increase in scientific knowledge). However, the text does not share the affectionate 
attitude the Professor adopts towards Percy. In the novel, the monkey functions as a 
caricature of human arrogant expectations about the essence of animality and its 
position in the species hierarchy.  
                                                 
15 Mark Axelrod, “Mozart, Moonshots, and Monkey Business in Brigid Brophy's Hackenfeller's Ape,” 
Review of Contemporary Fiction, Fall 1995: 18.  
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The fact that Percy belongs to an invented species allows for an unconventional 
use of anthropomorphism in the novel. In Flush, anthropomorphism is used in an 
attempt to understand animality through imagination. Flush in the novel is a typical 
animal and it is through his anthropomorphized figure that the reader is supposed to 
achieve a better understanding of animality per se. Brophy, on the other hand, does 
not see anthropomorphism as an appropriate tool to explore animality. Percy is meant 
to represent not so much a typical animal as an exceptional one and this exceptionality 
lies in him being physically more like a human than any other animal. In 
Hackenfeller’s Ape, he does not represent animality, rather he represents humanity. 
Brophy invents this almost human monkey in order to satirize various strategies 
developed in order to rationalize the concept of human superiority. Percy is described 
as “an animal discontent with his monkeydom, already exercising the first 
characteristic of Man, which Man had never satisfactory explained, self-restraint” 
(22). The word “discontent” serves as a reference to Civilization and its Discontents, 
where Freud offers a detailed explanation of the theory of organic repression. The 
connection is further emphasized by how Percy’s is a restraint from sexual intercourse 
and in Freud’s theory, it is precisely sexual repression that “leads to the founding of 
the family and so to the threshold of human civilization.”16 By rendering a humorous 
portrait of a monkey who demands “intellectual illumination” (18) and seeks 
“enlightenment” (21) Brophy exposes Freud’s theory as informed by the notion of 
progress and demonstrates how it sees the animal as just a lower step in the process of 
humanization. Another discourse that the character of Percy exposes as inherently 
progressive and deprecating towards animals is the discourse of evolution. 
“Evolution” is one of the first words that Percy learns to understand (22) and it is also 
in terms of evolution that the scientists understand the value of the newly discovered 
species: “[London zoologists] had allotted to the species its place in the Evolutionary 
progress, and had devised its Latin name” (16). Within both frameworks, a hierarchy 
emerges that positions the animal below the human. This hierarchy is internalized by 
Percy in his aspiration to become human and in his tendency to see people “as 
omnipotent and all-responsible” (57). This internalization is the key to the comic effect 
                                                 
16 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1961) 46-47. 
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Percy has on the reader. The notion that an animal agrees with the hierarchical and 
progressive understanding of nature embodied in the theory of organic repression and 
in the discourse of evolution is rendered utterly ridiculous. Both frameworks are thus 
exposed as inherently anthropocentric and biased.   
However, there is another important consequence of seeing the difference 
between individual species in terms of progress. As Cary Wolfe notices in Animal 
Rites, the theory of organic repression and the theory of evolution imply that  
the subject of humanism is constituted by a temporal and evolutionary stratification 
or asynchronicity in which supposedly “animalistic” or “primitive” determinations 
inherited from our evolutionary past (...) coexist uneasily in a second-order relation of 
relations, which the phantasmic “human” surfs or manages with varying degrees of 
success or difficulty. (3) 
 
In other words, the human is not seen as something stable and substantial, but as an 
evanescent quality whose origin and nature remains forever unknown. A clean break 
from animality, therefore, can never be achieved. Consequently, the human becomes 
a matter of negotiation and fluctuation. As has been mentioned before, in 
Hackenfeller’s Ape the human is first and foremost the position of power.  
The character of Kendrick makes it clear that this position of power is achieved 
through the use of the sadodispassionate approach to nature and the animal other. 
Kendrick, who makes his appearance at the end of the first chapter, is the scientist who 
wants to use Percy in a space exploration programme. It is through Kendrick that the 
concept of the sadodispassionate approach is elaborated in the novel. His attitude 
towards Percy is characterized by complete disengagement. He is practicing scientific 
objectivity and excludes all the emotional and the personal from the consideration of 
the animal. Kendrick is described as “unemphatic” (30) and “reasonable” (27). When 
asked about the sensations that Percy would experience in the rocket Kendrick plans 
to put him in, the man is confused: “‘Sensations?’ Kendrick wrinkled his nose, 
puzzled” (29), thus effectively demonstrating that he is not interested in any kind of 
subjective feelings. Commenting on this kind of interaction with the other, Val 
Plumwood points out,  
The insistence on such a concept of impartiality or disengagement imposes a rigid 
barrier between subject and object which excludes relationships of care, sympathy and 
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engagement with the fate of what is known, constructing connection as a source of 
error and the object known as alien to the knower.17 
 
The necessary result of this approach is that the scientific exploration is never truly 
interested in the other but is always “narrow, focusing on just those aspects of the other 
that can be exploited rather than aiming at a more rounded form of knowledge.”18 In 
other words, this form of knowledge, while presenting itself as unbiased and objective, 
is in fact power-ridden and dominated by the goals of the knower or the subject, while 
all the characteristics of the object that can undermine it are ignored or marginalized: 
“[i]t is inevitable that the knowledge relation is constructed as one in which the known 
is merely a means to the knower’s ends or to the ends of power which they, in the 
absence of respect and care, will come to serve.”19 Plumwood argues further that this 
kind of knowledge is always and necessarily political:  
Power is what rushes into the vacuum of disengagement; the fully ‘impartial’ knower 
can easily be one whose skills are for sale to the highest bidder, who will bend their 
administrative, research and pedagogical energies to wherever the power, prestige and 
funding is.20 
 
The sadodispassionate approach, as an exploitative and objectifying approach is, 
therefore, supported and reinforced by the political and social structure of society as it 
always reflects the agenda of the powerful.   
This is precisely the sentiment expressed in the figure of Kendrick who from 
the very start becomes connected to the notions of rigid hierarchy and authority. He 
has “an Air Force look” (25) and the mission that he wants to appropriate Percy for is 
“top priority” (27), with orders coming “from the highest level” (31). His appearance 
also exposes other binary oppositions that are reinforced by the object-subject division 
of the sadodispassionate approach. First of all, Kendrick is described as “manly” (26) 
and “clean” (25), cleanliness, or the cultural trend toward cleanliness being one of the 
main characteristics distinguishing humans from animals in Freud’s theory of organic 
repression. The Professor, on the other hand, starts moving towards the animal side of 
the human-animal opposition: “he had learnt from Percy one animal faculty. He felt 
                                                 
17 Plumwood, Environmental Culture, 42.  
18 Plumwood, Environmental Culture, 40. 




neither fear nor aggression, but a general wariness of danger” (26). The other 
opposition that is explored here is the gender binary. While Kendrick is “manly” (26) 
and displays all the characteristics of traditional masculinity (“physical courage” [25], 
strength and fitness [25] and self confidence), when we first see the Professor he is 
making “a womanish noise” (13) and imagining himself the Countess from Mozart's 
The Marriage of Figaro: “He became the middle-aged Countess, tragically and with 
dignity calling on Love to restore her treasure - the affections of her Count” (17). That 
manhood is a more powerful position to occupy in society is also expressed in the fact 
that from the very start the Professor refuses to consider the female monkey Edwina 
as deserving of his attention focusing all his interpretative energy on Percy. The text 
thus exposes the power imbalance in society demonstrating again how the animal and 
the woman are united by their underprivileged position. 
However, Kendrick himself does not occupy the highest position in the 
hierarchy. This is expressed early in the book when the Professor says: “You send 
male monkeys [...] where male men dare not go” (31) and learns that Kendrick indeed 
“would give [his] back teeth to go” (31) but cannot disobey “orders from the highest 
level” (31). This becomes crucial for the ending of the novel when Kendrick puts on 
Percy’s skin to get in the rocket to fulfil his dream and “see the stars” (31). This 
episode points to yet another type of relationship between animality and authority. As 
Derrida notices in The Beast and the Sovereign, the sovereign, the ultimate authority, 
and the beast have in common their “being-outside-the-law.”21 In other words, the law 
can be ignored by either the sovereign, the very creator of the law, or the animal who 
is “never in infraction of the law”22 and cannot commit a crime. Therefore, animality 
always contains the potential for transgression. This is already the case in Nightwood 
where the inhabitants of the night and the transgressors of the law exist on the 
vanishing border between the human and the animal. Here, Kendrick also has to lose 
his human status in order to deceive authorities. To defend his right to sacrifice himself 
he has to become a being whose sacrifice the system views as acceptable. Interestingly 
                                                 
21 Jacques Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 1 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2008) 17. 
22 Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, 147.  
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enough, the two adversaries, Kendrick and the Professor, become strangely paired as 
in both cases the transgression is enabled by animality.  
When the Professor, in his turn, refuses to submit to the power of authority and 
allow the monkey to be destroyed, his struggle is not against one institution or one 
official, he unwittingly engages in a battle against the whole system of meaning that 
supports the existing power structure and the oppositions it is predicated upon. The 
Professor thus becomes a rebel, which is also emphasized by the fact that he cannot 
stop thinking about The Marriage of Figaro that Brophy herself describes as the opera 
of the rebelling oppressed: “Figaro in which the alliance of the Countess, Susanna, 
Figaro and Cherubio, representing all the oppressed classes - servants women and the 
young - triumphs over the count, is a revolutionary document.”23  
His rebellion takes the Professor on a quest within which he tries to negotiate 
the meaning of animality with various other characters. His first visit is to his sister 
whom he cannot bring to acknowledge the importance of his enterprise. In her case 
against Percy the Professor’s sister relies on the logic of speciesism. “All this for a 
monkey” – she says and then continues: “Don’t you know [...] that people human 
beings, Clem – are starving in India; that men are dying in Malaya; that we still haven't 
cured cancer...” (38). She implies that as long as human suffering endures, addressing 
the problem of animal suffering is immoral. Brophy focuses on this kind of argument 
in “The Rights of Animals” and exposes it as an excuse for passivity: “Human fantasy 
often fabricates a dilemma as an excuse for inertia [...]. It is a principle of ‘divide and 
do nothing’” (19). As the dialogue continues, however, the sister makes a more 
interesting point. When the Professor argues that all the mentioned wrongs and 
injustices do not “make it right or just to sacrifice an innocent monkey” (38), his sister 
replies: “It doesn’t make the case right, but it makes you wrong [...] Here you are with 
all your brain – far more than I ever had – and all this needing to be done in the world, 
and you spend your time and energy on an animal!” (38) What is significant about this 
argument is that the monkey slips between its lines. While the original problem was 
with the animal, this logic makes Darrelhyde its new center (“It doesn’t make the case 
                                                 
23 Brigid Brophy, Mozart the Dramatist: the Value of his Operas to Him, to His Age, and to Us 
(London: Libris, 1988) 112. 
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right, but it makes you wrong”). The Professor is, therefore, unable to defend his case 
as the animal for whom he cares is excluded from the very line of reasoning he is 
presented with.    
After the Professor faces the first defeat in his quest (he describes it as a “false 
start” [37]), he proceeds to visit a newspaper office hoping to raise public outrage. 
However, as soon as the reporter learns that the matter in question and the mission for 
which Percy is being taken is “top priority, and top secret” (43) he states that he cannot 
publish such a story because the paper has been “pressing on with defense. Don’t relax 
and that sort of thing” (43) and because the paper runs “a space corner every Saturday” 
(43) and cannot be discouraging space travel. In other words, Percy’s tragedy cannot 
become public as it is meant to remain invisible within the existing system of power 
distribution. Again, he is viewed as merely a means to accomplish something this 
system views as important. It is significant, that the reporter does not learn anything 
about Percy except for his name and the fact that he is a monkey. In fact, he is not even 
sure whether he is a monkey or an ape until the Professor tells him there is no 
difference (42). The questions about the animal’s ability to feel suffering, fear and 
other emotions, the questions of whether it is moral to send a sentient and feeling being 
to his ultimate destruction have no place in the discourse of power where the word 
“animal” functions as a label undeserving of further scrutiny. The reporter’s 
ideologically pre-programmed inability to view Percy’s situation as a tragedy is 
emphasized at the end of this episode when the Professor asks him for the weather 
report (hoping the weather will not allow the launch of the rocket) and the reporter 
assumes that Darrelhyde has already forgotten about his “monkey business” and wants 
to be sure the weather will be good for his picnic.   
The Professor’s next appointment is with the coordinator of scientific studies 
named Post. Post is also unable to help the Professor, however, he is more than willing 
to explain why the Professor’s crusade is doomed. According to Post’s theory, 
humanity is and always has been fundamentally cruel and incapable of acting out of 
kindness. He refers to this fundamental cruelness and the drive to kill as “the mark of 
Cain” (49) that cannot be erased: 
“Why must we kill animals? You know as well as I do that Man can live perfectly 
healthily on a vegetable diet. Everyone knows. But we still say it’s necessary to kill 
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animals. The figures show that you can stop hanging murderers without encouraging 
murder, but we go on behaving as if hanging was necessary. The last two wars brought 
economic ruin to Europe but we still think that war is an economic necessity” 
“We made a mistake.” 
“Mistake nothing! Mankind invents necessities right and left to justify what it enjoys 
doing.” (50) 
 
Post’s theory advocates passivity on an even larger scale than the sister’s theory does, 
but, most importantly, it is again uninterested in animality. In this case too, the human 
comes to occupy the central position in the discussion. It is even visible in the quote 
above in how having started with the animal issue, Post swiftly moves to discussing 
human tragedies. 
The Professor’s last opponent and his last hope to save Percy without having 
to break the law is an animal rights activist named Colonel Hunter whose very surname 
suggests an opposition toward the issue of animal welfare. The Professor eventually 
finds out that the only thing Hunter and his League for the Prevention of Unkind 
Practices to Animals are doing is collecting horrifying images of animal suffering: “It 
was many years since the Professor had done any dissecting, yet, looking back, he was 
sure that not even in his greenest student years had he felt such nausea” (63). Hunter 
proceeds to show the professor “a real prize” (63) - “one of Pavlov’s original dogs” 
(63). Finally, when the Professor is about to leave Hunter asks him to send the pictures 
of Percy when he comes back from space and when Darrelhyde points out that Percy 
probably would not come back in one piece Hunter replies “That [...] would be even 
better” (65). Hunter is, thus, revealed as a sadist who enjoys bearing witness to 
suffering and probably even extracts sexual pleasure from it, which is hinted at in the 
following passage: “The Colonel bent down beside the cabinet and looked for a 
moment inside. Then he locked the door, put away his keys, and rose, puffed but with 
refreshed geniality” (64). In his monograph Electric Animal Akira Mizuta Lippit 
discusses the visual images of animal suffering as sources of sexual excitement and 
argues that the animal in this case serves as a mere tool to bypass “the responsibilities 
of reason, language, and consciousness” (181) that would forbid extracting pleasure 
from the images of human suffering. The fact that Hunter is a colonel also emphasizes 
the similarity between the two ultimately sadistic activities - hunt and war - that are 
both predicated on the disregard for suffering and the rejection of empathy.  
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The Professor’s unsuccessful quest reveals the inability of discourse to sustain 
the discussion of animality. The fact that Percy is a special monkey, almost human and 
presumably capable of experiencing every emotion does not once enter into the 
conversation. It is partly because the animal always occupies the lowest position in the 
hierarchy of power and thus the Professor’s intention to make the monkey’s case 
visible encounters the resistance of a system predicated upon animal exploitation. 
However, the quest also reveals an inherent quality of discourse and human 
subjectivity as such. In Animal Stories: Narrating Across Species Lines Susan 
McHugh addresses the issue of representing animals in literature. She points out that 
in the discourse of literature the animal more often than not serves as a metaphor for 
the human. While providing new and more elaborate ways for conceptualizing the 
human, the animal inhabits the literature “without somehow being represented 
therein.”24 However, this is not only the case of literature. Based on the abjection of 
animality, human subjectivity emerges as the opposite of the animal and so in the 
whole of discourse the subject’s inscription is achieved through the erasure of animal 
traces.25 Hence the structural impossibility, the impossibility that ensures the 
Professor’s failure, of making the animal the center of a discussion. In order to acquire 
a valid position in discourse the animal should represent or entail a human concern, 
otherwise it is always confined within the margins of discourse. This structure also 
ensures the irrelevance of an animal’s faculties and intelligence. Percy’s status as 
almost human only makes him a better target for researchers because he “would be 
nearest to human in its reaction” (29) while the question of whether his emotional 
capacity is almost human as well is never asked except by the Professor. In this respect, 
Percy does indeed represent a typical animal as he embodies the omnipresent tendency 
to deny animals any kind of subjective experience, thus making them perfect targets 
for exploitation.  
The Professor’s blindness to the scale of the issue is the source of the comical 
in the text and the reason his relationship with Percy is portrayed as inherently flawed. 
                                                 
24 Susan McHugh, Animal Stories: Narrating Across Species Lines (Minneapolis; London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2011) 6.  
25 Jacques Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” trans. David Wills, Critical 
Inquiry Vol. 28, 2002: 401. 
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After having been rejected five times, he thinks to himself that “humanity had proved 
wanting in humanness” (66). In fact, it is precisely the excess of humanness and the 
anthropocentric structure of discourse that has insured his defeat. From the very start, 
Darrelhyde’s rebellion against the system is portrayed as ridiculous in its pettiness. 
First of all, the female monkey Edwina is excluded from his concerns from the very 
start. He even makes a feeble attempt to save Percy by suggesting that Edwina be put 
on the rocket (“Why don’t you take the female” [30]) – a move he later comes to regret 
as ungallant. However, the most important point that betrays the shallow nature of the 
Professor’s approach is that it is also biased by anthropocentricity. It is Percy’s 
humanity that initially attracts the Professor’s attention, his apparent ability to 
appreciate Mozart and his “idealistic obstinacy” (41) from sexual intercourse. 
Furthermore, the instructions that the Professor gives Percy after learning about 
Kendrick’s plans also focus on humanity’s concerns rather than the monkey’s: 
“You’ve got to survive, and you’ve got to procreate. We may need you. When my 
species has destroyed itself, we may need yours to start it all again” (33). However, 
this point sounds more like a rationalization of the Professors sentimental attachment 
to the monkey than a valid argument. First of all, according to the text, Percy is not 
the last Hackenfeller’s Ape on the planet, the species is not even endangered. 
Secondly, the Professor never mentions this argument to any of the people he seeks 
help from. The Professor’s overall incompetence is further emphasized in the chapters 
that follow his attempts to liberate Percy. It is only after the cage is broken and Percy 
disappears into the night that Darrelhyde remembers “the notes Hackenfeller had made 
about these animals’ agility when they were free” (83). The question that keeps 
bothering him, on the other hand, is the question of “whether his landlady would 
accommodate Percy” (80).       
Populated by caricatures of human arrogance and, in the Professor’s case, 
feebleness and incompetence, Hackenfeller’s Ape appears to be without a hero. It also 
appears to be without an animal, as Percy is a caricature of an idealized and 
sentimentalized animality. However, it is behind this irony and satire that the genuine 
concern of the text is to be found. It is visible in a number of brief passages like the 
one that shows the Professor not particularly enjoying his meal in the Corner House:  
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It turned out to be a rissole of hashed meat. His knowledge of comparative anatomy 
was no use; the meat has gone through a mincing machine and he could not identify 
it. It seemed to him a macabre reflection that a human body was so sacred that soldiers 
would break off in the middle of war to collect it and give it a solemn burial, whereas 
an animal’s body could be mangled pas recognition and still not offend the human 
taste. (45) 
 
It is also in the pictures from Hunter’s office that a zoologist cannot look at without 
experiencing nausea; and in the fact that almost all characters of the book eventually 
reveal their uncomfortableness with zoos or sending animals to space (even the 
controller of the space mission eventually admits that “it’s a pretty poor show to use 
animals” [110] and that he, a soldier, could not help feeling sentimental watching what 
he thought was Percy walking to the rocket); and finally in the images of all the dogs 
and monkeys who, after having been “called to higher things” (27), never made it in 
one piece – the text never names them, but their shadows are bound to appear in the 
imagination of every reader. The very structure of Brophy’s novel reflects the marginal 
position of animals and especially of animal suffering in human society’s discourse. 
However, the text also emphasizes that this marginal position is not completely 
powerless as its very existence unsettles and confuses this discourse and undermines 
the stability of human subjectivity. As Derrida puts it: “The treatment of animality, as 
of everything that finds itself in submission by virtue of a hierarchical opposition, has 
always, in the history of (humanist and phallogocentric) metaphysics, revealed 
obscurantist resistance.”26 By acknowledging this resistance and rejecting the 
traditional ways of approaching animality, Brophy’s novel opens the dialogue on 
animal representation as such.  
  
                                                 
26 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987) 474. 
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6. Animal Representation, Meat-Eating and 
Responsibility in the Two Animal Lessons of 
Elizabeth Costello 
I believe one has a duty (an ethical duty? – perhaps) not to 
submit to powers of discourse without question 
J.M. Coetzee 
 
J.M. Coetzee’s novel Elizabeth Costello: Eight Lessons explicitly addresses 
the problem of human-animal relationships. This issue is present in all of Coetzee’s 
fiction, but it is in Elizabeth Costello that the animal question and the concern with the 
ways in which humanity treats animals become central. In the third and the fourth 
‘lessons’ of the novel (“The Lives of Animals: The Philosophers and the Animals” 
and “The Lives of Animals: The Poets and the Animals”), two issues assume special 
importance: the representation of animals in human discourse, and the practice of 
meat-eating as well as the intensive animal farming industry that sustains it.  
The problem of animal representation is already suggested by the publication 
history of these two lessons. Originally presented in 1997 and 1998 at Princeton 
University as part of the Tanner Lectures series on human values within, the lectures 
were published two years later as The Lives of Animals, accompanied by responses 
from four thinkers from various disciplines. They finally became part of Elizabeth 
Costello: Eight Lessons, Coetzee’s ninth novel, in 2003. Of the two stages the text 
passed through to becoming a novel, the first one is of special importance because it 
signifies Coetzee’s refusal to comply with certain formal requirements of the lecture 
series and thus becomes an act of resistance. The nature and the object of this 
resistance must necessarily be identified in order to outline Coetzee’s understanding 
of the problems underlying the act of dicussing animals and animal representation per 
se. Derek Attridge, who was present in 1997 in the auditorium when Coetzee surprised 
the public by reading a work of short fiction instead of  a proper lecture, summarizes 
the unsettling effect of Coetzee’s performance in the following sentence:  
What made the event in which we were participating all the more disquieting was our 
gradual realization that it was being mirrored, in a distorted representation, in the 
fiction itself: the central character was revealed to be a novelist from the Southern 
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Hemisphere who had been asked to give a lecture at an American college, and who 
had chosen to speak on the human treatment of animals.27   
 
The quote emphasizes how instead of remaining outside the text’s focus, the event of 
the lecture becomes its central concern. As a result, the stable and authoritative 
meaning that is conventionally expected of a lecture is opposed to the plurality of 
meaning that is the province of fiction.28 In other words, Coetzee forgoes the right to 
voice his opinion from the powerful and ultimately monological position of a lecturer 
(and a prominent authority on the subject) assuming instead the far less powerful 
position of a fiction reader. This new role, however, allows him to criticize the very 
format of the event he was invited to participate in and to address the problems such a 
format presents to the discussion of animal-related issues.  
The narrative of the two lessons is internally focalized and the reader perceives 
the events from the perspective of Elizabeth’s son, John Bernard. This device allows 
Coetzee to consider the complexity of the network of relationships at the center of 
which Elizabeth finds herself, and to demonstrate how the discourse within which 
animal-related issues are framed is always already embedded within other discursive 
contexts in relation to which it operates.29 Throughout the two lessons, Elizabeth’s son 
repeatedly undermines her and her ideas, viewing his mother’s visit to the university 
and particularly her determination to give a talk about animals as a dangerous intrusion 
upon his private and professional life. The flow of his private life becomes disrupted 
by the fact that “his wife and his mother do not get on”30 and it is later revealed that at 
the heart of Norma’s dislike are Elizabeth’s opinions on animals: “As for Norma, she 
has never hesitated to tell him that his mother’s books are overrated, that her opinions 
on animals, animal consciousness, and ethical relations with animals are jejune and 
sentimental” (61). However, the narrator also exposes the possibility of other factors 
Norma’s antagonism towards Elizabeth: “Having moved with him to Appleton, she 
                                                 
27 Derek Attridge, J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading: Literature in the Event (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2004) 193. 
28 Robert McKay, “Metafiction, Vegetarianism, and the Literary Performance of Animal Ethics in J. M. 
Coetzee's The Lives of Animals,” Safundi 11, January 2010: 71.  
29 McKay, “Metafiction, Vegetarianism, and the Literary Performance,” 76. 
30 J.M. Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello: Eight Lessons (London, Vintage Books, 2004) 59. All future page 
references will be to this edition and will be included in parentheses in the text. 
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has been unable to find a teaching position. This is a cause of bitterness to her, and of 
conflict between the two of them” (61). Thus, the text raises the possibility that 
Norma’s dislike might be at least partly inspired by factors completely unrelated to 
animal issues, but rather to do with their specific family dynamic. That John “is not 
sure he wants to hear her [Elizabeth] once again on the topic of animal rights, 
particularly when he knows he will afterwards be treated, in bed, to his wife’s 
disparaging commentary” (60-61) points to the fact that the topic Costello has chosen 
for her lecture cannot be confined to the realm of the academia and the purely 
theoretical. Indeed it signifies that the cause of John’s resistance is not the ideas 
Elizabeth promotes, but their implications for his everyday life. The same can be said 
for Norma’s reaction to the lecture: at the end of the second lesson she says, “I would 
have more respect for her if she didn’t try to undermine me behind my back, with her 
stories to the children about the poor little veal calves and what the bad men do to 
them. I am tired of having them pick at their food and ask, ‘Mom, is this veal?’” (113-
114). Here Norma explicitly connects her feelings regarding Elizabeth’s talk to the 
impact her ideas have on the family’s daily routine. Thus, the mode Coetzee chose for 
his performance at Princeton, with its capacity to explore the characters’ private lives, 
allows him to highlight the extent to which the issues Elizabeth discusses in her lecture 
are interconnected with concerns seemingly external to the philosophical 
understanding of animality: the concerns of a purely practical nature. This in its turn 
suggests that talking about animals is always complicated by the fact, that, even when 
discussed at an academic gathering, the topic always invades people’s private lives, 
casting a shadow over their daily practices and indirectly demanding a change.     
However, it is not only the family’s private life that Coetzee focuses upon. The 
text also repeatedly accents John’s anxiety regarding the effect Elizabeth's lecture 
might have on his professional life. He assesses Elizabeth's success (or rather, failure) 
as a performer, making it clear that the ideas Elizabeth voices from the stage are in 
conflict with what the institution expects of her. John describes her role as that of “the 
paid entertainer” (86) and thinks that she should try to satisfy the expectations of the 
public, but instead of pleasing her audience Elizabeth provokes them, which 
eventually causes John’s silent outburst:  
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He wishes his mother had not come. It is nice to see her again [...] but the price he is 
paying and the price he stands to pay if the visit goes badly seem to him excessive. 
Why can she not be an ordinary old woman living an ordinary old woman’s life? If 
she wants to open her heart to animals, why can’t she stay home and open it to her 
cats? (83) 
 
This shows that the reason John is so irritated with his mother can be formulated in 
the following manner: she does not know her place. Indeed, that John sees his mother 
as first of all “an old woman” is emphasized already in the first lesson of the book, 
“Realism”, which is also told from John’s perspective, where he thinks to himself, 
“She has never taken care of her appearance; she used to be able to get away with it; 
now it shows. Old and tired” (3). In “The Philosophers and Animals” this point is 
accented even further: “Two years have passed since he last saw his mother; despite 
himself, he is shocked at how she has aged” (59). By constantly underlining his 
mother’s feebleness and old age, John suggests her incompatibility with the powerful 
role of a teacher or a lecturer. The thought that runs through his discourse is that “she 
should not be doing this” (82). Robert McKay in his essay “Metafiction, 
Vegetarianism, and the Literary Performance of Animal Ethics in J.M. Coetzee’s The 
Lives of Animals”, suggests that the reason behind Coetzee’s portrayal of the public 
lecture as a tense, nerve-wracking experience is that a senile old woman lecturing on 
the topic of animal suffering amounts to an ultimate breach of the standards imposed 
by the logic of carno-phallogocentrism,31 which requires that the position of power be 
occupied by a virile male figure who “accepts sacrifice and eats flesh”.32 While the 
influence of carno-phallogocentrism can wax and wane depending on the 
circumstances, the text indicates that “the public speech, as a prime site of ‘authority 
and autonomy,’ is the carno-phallogocentric arena par excellence”.33 In other words, 
a public lecture is an exercise in subjectivity – here the ultimate subject, rational and 
knowledgeable, occupies the center of everybody's attention and therefore the most 
powerful position. In order to seem appropriate and to satisfy the expectations of the 
organizers and the audience, the presenter, even if she is a woman, has to at least partly 
                                                 
31 McKay, “Metafiction, Vegetarianism, and the Literary Performance,” 75. 
32 Jacques Derrida, “’Eating Well,’ or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jacques 
Derrida,” Who Comes after the Subject? Ed. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, Jean-Luc Nancy (New 
York; London: Routledge, 1991) 114. 
33 McKay, “Metafiction, Vegetarianism, and the Literary Performance,” 75. 
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embody strength and virility, or to let oneself “be translated into a virile and heroic 
schema,”34 if not in their appearance then at least in the strength and coherence of their 
argumentation. To be otherwise risks objection regarding why this person was given 
the right to speak.  
Elizabeth fails in all these respects. On the stage, she looks “old and tired” (62); 
her delivery is flat, since “she does not look up from the page” (63); and her lecture 
appears to be “ill-gauged, ill-argued” (80). However, all these negative appearances 
merely reveal or highlight the main reason the lecture is called a failure: its content 
undermines the concept of the human as “the center of the universe” (69) and subverts 
the sacrificial order upon which human subjectivity is built. The “strange talk” (80) 
Elizabeth gives is therefore ontologically incompatible with the format of a public 
lecture, in exactly the same manner that Coetzee’s speech, had he chosen to respect 
the organizers’ expectations and given a proper lecture, would have been ontologically 
incompatible with the format of the Tanner Lectures. Hence, the endless deferral of 
authorship witnessed here. To avoid occupying the position of the ultimate subject and 
to expose the conflict between the format of the lecture and the topic he wanted to 
discuss, Coetzee prefers to speak through Costello, using the character of an elderly 
woman to  expose the logic of carno-phallogocentrism that would have been less 
visible had the stage been given to a man.  
It is important that John as well as other characters misconstrue the discursive 
strategies that Elizabeth uses to undermine carno-phallogocentrism. To render his 
mother’s agenda more comprehensible for himself, John connects her ideas to the 
discourse of animal rights advocacy (61) as does Thomas O’Hearne, professor of 
philosophy and her opponent in a debate, who starts his first question with “My first 
reservation about the animal-rights movement…” (105). During her talk, however, 
Elizabeth tries to distance herself from the discourse of rights.  
And being human, or humanoid, these voices go on, the great apes should then be 
accorded human rights, or humanoid rights. [...] At least those rights that we accord 
mentally defective specimens of the species Homo sapiens: the right to life, the right 
not to be subjected to pain or harm, the right to equal protection before the law. 
That is not what Red Peter was striving for when he wrote, through his 
amanuensis Franz Kafka, the life history that, in November of 1917, he proposed to 
read to the Academy of Science. Whatever else it may have been, his report to the 
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academy was not a plea to be treated as a mentally defective human being, a simpleton. 
(70) 
 
This quotation reveals that Elizabeth’s problem with this discourse is that it replicates 
the supposed mistake of measuring and estimating all beings according to the degree 
of similarity they bear to human beings. She condemns the “misguided logic driving 
the animal rights movement, showing how it inadvertently reinscribes the priority of 
the human in its very defense of the capacity of animals for humanlike interaction”.35 
The discourse of rights remains profoundly humanist in its nature and once again relies 
on the notion of the rational and self-present subject who can create a functional 
hierarchy of beings and their rights. This logic is deeply alien to Costello who is trying 
to find a way of thinking and talking about animals that goes beyond humanism. She 
does so by undermining reason as the central element of human subjectivity and the 
justifying principle of human supremacy.   
When at the beginning of the fourth lesson, John and Norma discuss 
Elizabeth’s talk in the privacy of their bedroom, Norma sums up her opinion as 
follows: “There is no position outside of reason where you can stand and lecture about 
reason and pass judgment on reason” (93). Here Norma identifies Costello's intention 
accurately, but she is not able to see that in her talk Elizabeth attempts both to construct 
such a position outside of reason and to show why this enterprise is doomed to failure. 
It is important to remember that Norma does not present a counter argument to 
Elizabeth’s statements, but merely repeats and rephrases what Costello herself says in 
her lecture:  
Of course reason will validate reason as the first principle of the universe – what else 
should it do? Dethrone itself? Reasoning systems, as systems of totality, do not have 
that power. If there were a position from which reason could attack and dethrone itself, 
reason would already have occupied that position; otherwise it would not be total. (70) 
 
Costello thus recognizes the theoretical impossibility of passing judgment on reason 
without resorting to it. Her lecture, therefore, contains an ostensibly unresolvable 
contradiction. On the one hand, she renounces the “discourse of old philosophers” (67) 
                                                 
35 Elizabeth Susan Anker, “Elizabeth Costello, Embodiment, and the Limits if Rights.” New Literary 
History, volume 42, number 1, winter 2011: 175.  
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who saw reason as the organizing principle of all life and used this idea to establish 
and justify human supremacy:  
The universe is built upon reason. God is a God of reason. The fact that through the 
application of reason we can come to understand the rules by which the universe 
works proves that reason and the universe are of the same being. And the fact that 
animals, lacking reason, cannot understand the universe but have simply to follow its 
rules blindly, proves that, unlike man, they are part of it but not part of its being: that 
man is godlike, animals thinglike. (67) 
 
Instead, she insists that reason is “the being of human thought” (67) or even “one 
tendency in human thought” (67). The fact that humans possess reason and other 
beings probably do not does not give us the right to create hierarchies and draw borders 
that mark certain beings as disposable. On the other hand, Costello repeatedly and 
insistently emphasizes her willingness to resort to the discourse of reason: “indeed for 
a while [I] will be resorting to it [philosophical language]” (66) and later, “So let me, 
to prove my goodwill, my credentials, make a gesture in the direction of scholarship 
and give you my scholarly speculations, backed up with footnotes” (71). To resolve 
this contradiction it is important to understand that, for Elizabeth, reason is not only 
the “tendency in human thought” that justifies the killing (indeed first birthing and 
then killing) of astronomical numbers of beings, but is also a representational impasse. 
As reason operates through ideas, its only means of approaching animality is through 
abstraction: through the idea of the animal. However, the idea of the animal is merely 
part of the “system of totality” (70) that is reason and as such, it serves only to support 
the “narrow, self-regenerating” (69) intellectual tradition of Western metaphysics. In 
other words, the idea of the animal has little connection to animality as such; its only 
purpose is to ensure that a certain order remains intact. For a reason-based order to 
acknowledge that animal life (which presumably lacks the capacity to reason) has 
value would be to effectively deconstruct itself, or at least acknowledge the emptiness 
of its claims to totality and universality, which it naturally resists. Thus, according to 
the logic of Costello’s argumentation, the discourse of reason, which to her is best 
represented by  “philosophical language” (66), can never access animality. Facing the 
necessity of employing this language to give a public lecture, Costello invents a new, 
hybrid discourse that uses reason and renounces it at the same time.  
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This hybrid discourse is created by engagement with the master of radical 
heterogeneity:  Franz Kafka. As part of the aforementioned deferral of authorship, 
Costello delegates her authorial privileges to the protagonist of Kafka’s short story “A 
Report to an Academy”: a monkey named Red Peter. At the very start of her talk, she 
compares herself to this fictional talking ape and emphasizes that this comparison is 
to be taken at face value: “I want to say at the outset that that was not how my remark 
– the remark that I feel like Red Peter – was intended. I did not intend it ironically. It 
means what it says. I say what I mean” (62). This seemingly unimportant and 
whimsical remark creates a new dimension to Elizabeth’s talk which transforms it 
dramatically. At the heart of Kafka’s story, of an ape who masters human language 
and gives a report to an academy in order to earn and preserve his freedom and possibly 
life, is the denunciation of reason. In the story, the discourse of reason and the status 
of the human become matters of imitation, reenactment and performance36 that do not 
guarantee access to any transcendental meaning. Rather, reason is exposed as the 
means of justifying violence committed both against oneself by processes of restraint 
and repression; and against others, most importantly for Elizabeth’s talk, animal 
others. As Margot Norris puts it: “[Red Peter] can indict humans for cruelty without 
offending them by supplying them with the cultural and rational motives consistent 
with the self-congratulatory vanity that allowed post-Darwinian man to consider 
himself the pinnacle of creation.”37 Elizabeth’s reference to Kafka’s story similary 
reveals the satirical dimension of her talk. Just as in “A Report to an Academy” it is 
the “honored members of the Academy”38 who are being ridiculed, in Elizabeth’s 
mock lecture it is the event itself, its audience and its requirements that are satirized.  
However, there is also a more sinister level to Costello’s engagement with 
Kafka. In the story, Red Peter’s successful imitation of human ways is something he 
was forced to do in order to save his life and secure his freedom. In a similar way, 
Costello’s rational argumentation, and her lecture as a whole, is something she 
believes she has to do to save lives, albeit not her own life but the lives of countless 
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37 Norris, Beasts of the Modern Imagination, 70. 
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suffering others who “refuse to talk to us” (70). As “Red Peter took it upon himself to 
make the arduous descent from the silence of the beast to the gabble of reason” (71), 
so Costello attempts to swap the role of paid entertainer for the role of messenger and 
judge. For her message to be heard and her criticism to have value, however, they have 
to come from both within and outside the order she seeks to criticize. She therefore 
employs the discourse of reason while constantly referring to something that, to her 
mind, cannot be rationalized: the wound, the pain that serves as the link between her, 
Red Peter, and all those who suffer:  
Red Peter was not an investigator of primate behavior but a branded, marked, 
wounded animal presenting himself as speaking testimony to a gathering of scholars. 
I am not a philosopher of mind but an animal exhibiting, yet not exhibiting, to a 
gathering of scholars, a wound, which I cover up under my clothes but touch on in 
every word I speak. (70-71) 
 
Elizabeth realizes that the position outside reason cannot be a human one, but weary 
of labels, she does not push this perspective over the imaginary border to the animal 
side. Rather, she demonstrates that the position outside reason can be located with the 
realization that not one of us is purely human in the way reason, “the language of 
philosophy” imagines us to be. Costello affirms that it is from this non-human place 
within himself that Kafka writes his fiction: “Of all men Kafka is the most insecure in 
his humanity” (75). In both Costello’s and Red Peter’s cases this place is located 
through the experience of pain, which resists rationalization in both her talk and in 
Kafka’s lecture. In “A Report to an Academy”, Red Peter both mentions and does not 
mention the barbaric methods of his humanization and civilization, as Elizabeth notes: 
“Kafka’s story deals with the cost: we learn what it consists in through the ironies and 
silences of the story” (72), and similarly Elizabeth exhibits, yet does not exhibit, her 
“wound”: her acute awareness of the immense suffering that cannot be expressed in 
the language of reason. This inexpressible and unjustifiable suffering and pain, which 
make readers of Kafka’s story side always with the monkey, adds yet another 
dimension to Costello’s talk: the dimension beyond reason and beyond humanism, in 
which Costello and Red Peter, whether human or animal, fictional or real, are one and 
the same.     
However, the density and multilevel structure of Costello’s speech prevent the 
audience from understanding her intentions. The speech receives “scattered” (80) 
92 
 
applause and the only person allowed to raise a question asks for clarification (81). 
Indeed, the performance Costello gives can only be comprehended in the form of a 
text. In this manner, Coetzee further emphasizes the complete incompatibility of the 
animal question with the genre of public lecture and asserts that the representation of 
animality can only be attempted through the complementary processes of reading and 
writing. This is also the reason that the text, which was originally performed, was later 
published twice as part of two different volumes.  
This is also consistent with the ideas Costello voices during the literary seminar 
that follows the next day. If the lecture is a frustrating and exhausting attempt to 
inscribe animality in the discourse of reason, however feebly or inaccurately, the 
atmosphere of the seminar is conversely one of hopefulness. During the seminar 
Costello mentions two types of poetry about animals: the poetry that tries to find an 
idea in the animal (96) and the other that is “the record of an engagement with [the 
animal]” (96). This former type can be described in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms as 
the writing of becoming. Unlike the writing that always looks for metaphors and 
analogies in which, as Costello puts it, “animals stand for human qualities: the lion for 
courage, the owl for wisdom” (94-95), writing of becoming seeks for what Deleuze 
calls zones of proximity: “To become is not to attain a form (identification, imitation, 
Mimesis) but to find the zone of proximity, indiscernibility, or undifferentiation.”39 
These zones of proximity are found through experience of the physical world; the 
experiences of the body rather than the spirit. They become a means to enter “new 
levels, zones of liberated intensities where contents free themselves from their forms 
as well as from their expressions, from the signifier that formalizes them.”40 Costello 
describes Ted Hughes’ poem “Jaguar” as exactly this type of writing, as it expresses 
the animal through engagement with its particular, non-human motion in space. In the 
poem, she says, “we know the jaguar not from the way he seems but from the way he 
moves. [...] The poems ask us to imagine our way into the way of moving, to inhabit 
the body” (96). The quote also suggests that the discourse of literature is able to 
express “a different kind of being-in-the-world” (95) precisely because it is the 
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discourse of imagination which, according to Costello is the force that facilitates 
endless becomings: “If I can think my way into the existence of a being that has never 
existed, then I can think my way into the existence of a bat or a chimpanzee, or an 
oyster, any being with whom I share the substance of life” (80). This substance of life, 
or as she puts it in her lecture, “a heavily affective sensation – of being a body with 
limbs that have extension in space, of being alive in the world” (78), is the zone of 
proximity that humans have in common with all animals. Costello insists that rather 
than imagining ourselves as a “ghostly reasoning machine thinking thoughts” (78) and 
turning reason into an unclimbable wall that encircles the form of being in the world 
we designate human, we should seek communion with animals through acts of what 
she calls “sympathetic imagination” (80). For Costello, literature as a type of discourse 
that serves imagination rather than reason has greater potential for engagement with 
the animal other. Unlike the discourse of philosophy, which always keeps its distance 
from the body and operates on the level of ideas, literature according to Costello can 
virtually inhabit the animal body and recreate, at least to a certain degree, the animal’s 
unique way of experiencing the world. This claim is indeed problematic, however, it 
needs to be analyzed in connection with another aspect of literature concerned with 
animals (as Costello imagines it); namely, the issue of unintentionality. The question 
of authorial intent is touched upon in both Elizabeth’s lecture and the following 
seminar. Kafka figures in the text as the master of becoming, but in her talk, Costello 
pictures his becomings as ungovernable and unpredictable. “A Report to an 
Academy”, she says, was written through Kafka rather than by him: “That is not what 
Red Peter was striving for when he wrote, through his amanuensis Franz Kafka, the 
life history that, in November of 1917, he proposed to read to the Academy of Science” 
(70). When she speaks about Kafka the author Costello seeks to emphasize the extent 
to which he could not contain or control his own creativity: “The stare that we meet in 
all the surviving photographs of Kafka is a stare of pure surprise: surprise, 
astonishment, alarm” (75). This idea resurfaces in her discussion of Wolfgang 
Kohler’s The Mentality of Apes, “[b]ut the book we read isn’t the book he thought he 
was writing” (82); and later during the seminar when she answers a student question 
on the poetry of Ted Hughes with, “I would reply, writers teach us more than they are 
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aware of” (97). For Costello, therefore, literary becomings expose reading and writing 
as two inseparable processes and are, at least to some extent, unintentional.  
This argument can also be understood as an extension of her denunciation of 
reason. Reason, the text suggests, is a position of power and control. The human, as 
long as it is defined through reason, gains its authority precisely by the ability to 
control, manage, predict and solve. From this perspective of a self-present, strong and 
effective subject, animality remains inaccessible and, therefore, any creative endeavor 
to engage with it should be made from a position different from that of a confident 
author and creator. In fact in order to gain understanding of other modes of being in 
the world, especially of  animal mode(s) of being, one has to abandon any pretense of 
control and mastery. According to the logic of the text, therefore, any attempt to access 
animality is also an exercise in humility.  
On this point Costello and her amanuensis are in complete agreement, as the 
main feature of the Coetzee’s chosen protagonist, as the vehicle for his ideas, is her 
incertitude. The question John repeatedly asks himself throughout the novel is, “Why 
can’t she just come out and say what she wants to say?” (82). When he finally 
confronts his mother on this point, she is not able to give him any definite answer:  
“And that is what you want to cure humankind of?” 
“John, I don’t know what I want to do. I just don’t want to sit 
silent.” (104) 
 
The same tendency is evident in Elizabeth’s interactions with other characters. When 
she is asked about the motives behind her vegetarianism and her concern for animals, 
she either refuses to give any answer, for example after the lecture in response to the 
request for clarification to which she replies, “I was hoping not to have to enunciate 
principles” (82), or gives an answer that places her beliefs beyond the reach of reason: 
“But your own vegetarianism, Mrs. Costello,” says President Garrard, pouring oil on 
troubled waters: “it comes out of moral conviction, does it not?”  
“No, I don’t think so,” says his mother. “It comes out of a desire to save my soul.” 
(88-89) 
 
Elizabeth’s resistance to clear-cut morals or principles is further emphasized by her 
dismissive response to President Garrard’s admiration for Costello’s “way of life” 
(89): “’I’m wearing leather shoes,’ says his mother. ‘I’m carrying a leather purse. I 
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wouldn’t have overmuch respect if I were you’” (89). All this points to Costello’s 
determination to distance herself from the position of a self-present subject who has 
all the answers to hand. Coetzee creates in Costello a character for whom doubt is not 
a transition between two certainties, but a permanent position. When in the last chapter 
Elizabeth is asked to make a statement that summarizes her beliefs, she says, “I believe 
in what does not bother to believe in me” (218). This refusal effectively puts her 
outside the human category, as the mysterious gatekeeper has already informed her 
that “[w]e all believe. We are not cattle” (194).  
While the concepts of sympathetic imagination and becoming can provide 
useful insights, they should not be understood as universal strategies for animal 
representation. Rather, these are concepts that put animal presence at the intersection 
of the reading and writing processes, and while affirming the possibility of animal 
representation as such, accent its incompatibility with the notion of literature as a 
controlled event emerging from the attempts of a self-present subject.  Thus, the type 
of post-humanist subjectivity that Coetzee constructs through Costello is based on 
uncertainty as well as humbleness and consequently is opposed to Cartesian 
subjectivity predicated on its power to understand and explain. The main idea behind 
Costello’s (and Coetzee’s) discourse on animal representation is that there can be no 
final solution to that problem as within this discourse the very logic of final solutions 
is discredited as anthropocentric and  profoundly biased.  
Elizabeth’s argumentation against reason, the restrictive outlook it affords, and 
its inability to create space for other forms of being leads to the condemnation of the 
custom of meat-eating and even more so, the modern food industry. In this case too, 
Elizabeth is “exhibiting, yet not exhibiting” (71) the main grounds for making, or 
rather repeating, the contentious comparison of what was done to the Jews in the 
Holocaust with what is being done to animals in food industry today. In her talk she 
mainly stresses the “certain willed ignorance” (64) of those who knew about the camps 
but did nothing. On the one hand, this strategy is part of Elizabeth’s mimicking of the 
logic of “A Report to an Academy” in which Red Peter manages to make his audience 
the main focus of his report. Elizabeth tells a familiar (and still horrifying) story, but 
alters its inflections so that those who watched passively rather than the perpetrators 
of the crime are forced into the spotlight. Within this comparison, the audience of her 
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own talk becomes implicated in the crime of animal mass-slaughter, just as the passive 
“Germans of particular generation” (64) are implicated in the crime of the Holocaust. 
 On the other hand, however, this seems to be only the surface level of 
Elizabeth’s argumentation, the deeper currents of which remain again obscured by her 
complicated strategy of hints and silences. While she describes certain behavior as 
appalling, she is mainly interested in what “lies behind” (82) this behavior. Costello 
seems to blame the “willed ignorance” on a certain limit to sympathy: a border 
sympathy dares not cross:  
The particular horror of the camps, the horror that convinces us that what went on 
there was a crime against humanity, is not that despite a humanity shared with their 
victims, the killers treated them like lice. That is too abstract. The horror is that the 
killers refused to think themselves into the place of their victims, as did everyone else. 
They said, ‘It is they in those cattle-cars rattling past.’ They did not say, ‘How would 
it be if it were I in that cattle-car?’ They did not say, ‘It is I who am in that cattle-car.’  
In other words, they closed their hearts. The heart is the seat of a faculty, 
sympathy, that allows us to share at times the being of another. (79)    
 
She never voices her opinion on the origin of this limit to sympathy that, to her, is the 
reason behind the tragedy of the Holocaust. However, it can be inferred from the 
specific vocabulary Elizabeth uses to refer to the death camps, as well as from her 
criticism of reason. In Elizabeth’s talk, both the extermination camps and the 
slaughterhouses become enterprises devoted to production. On more than one occasion 
she reminds her audience that it was “from the Chicago stockyards that the Nazis 
learned how to process bodies” (97). The implication is that the Holocaust was to a 
great extent inspired and facilitated by the emergence of new efficient means of 
production. It was, in other words, a factory “dedicated to the production of death” 
(66). This connection makes the Holocaust not a malfunction of reason, a failure to 
subdue certain violent, anti-human drives, but rather the culmination of reason 
combined with the modern ideals of efficiency and social engineering. Zygmunt 
Bauman writes in Modernity and the Holocaust that “it was the spirit of instrumental 
rationality, and its modern, bureaucratic form of institutionalization, which had made 
the Holocaust-style solutions not only possible, but eminently ‘reasonable’ – and 
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increased the probability of their choice.”41 Furthermore, he argues that it is precisely 
the perfectly reasonable nature of the Holocaust as a means to overcome what was 
seen as a certain inefficiency in society’s functioning that made it acceptable in the 
eyes of the people:  
The truth is that every ‘ingredient’ of the Holocaust – all those many things that 
rendered it possible – was normal; [...] in the sense of being fully in keeping with 
everything we know about our civilization, its guiding spirit, its priorities, its 
immanent vision of the world –  and of the proper ways to pursue human happiness 
together with a perfect society.42 
 
 In other words, the extermination of millions of human beings fitted perfectly with 
the discourse of civilization and the necessity of progress it imposed; its morally 
abhorrent nature was thus rendered invisible. Consequently, the failure to sympathize 
with the victims becomes not a personal failure but a necessity programmed by the 
system and its discourse. Here one feels the need to quote the epigraph to this chapter 
again: Coetzee in his interview with David Attwell says, “I believe one has a duty (an 
ethical duty? – perhaps) not to submit to powers of discourse without question.”43 This 
is the message Costello seeks to communicate to her audience. However, what she 
stresses in her talk and what constitutes grounds for the notorious comparison between 
the Holocaust and the meat industry is not merely the contention that the border 
between humans and animals is a construct akin to the border between Jews and their 
murderers. Rather, Costello aims to go deeper to underline the similarities between the 
discourse of fascism, which was in its turn dependent on the modern discourse of 
civilization and efficiency, and that of industrialism, that insists that viewing animals 
as a commodity and a resource to be processed by industrial means does not constitute 
a moral dilemma. In other words, Costello is not arguing against the practice of meat-
eating as such, but against the industry that in contemporary times continues to sustain 
this practice: factory farming. She is trying to make her audience see that what is being 
hidden by the powers of discourse in both cases is not merely a crime, but a crime of 
massive, ungraspable proportions. It is with the magnitude of this crime that Elizabeth 
                                                 
41 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1989) 
18. 
42 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 9.  
43 J.M. Coetzee, Doubling the Point: Essays and Interviews. Ed. David Attwell (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1992) 200. 
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is most concerned when she says, “These are numbers that numb the mind. We have 
only one death of our own; we can comprehend the deaths of others only one at a time. 
In the abstract we may be able to count to a million, but we cannot count to a million 
deaths” (63). By returning to the language of factories and production in both the 
animal farming industry and the Holocaust, Costello exposes the discourse of progress 
and efficiency as capable of rendering even mass killings normal and necessary, 
seemingly in the hope of preventing humanity from being taken in by it again. 
However, in this case too, Costello is misunderstood. Abraham Stern, the poet 
who after Costello’s talk refuses to attend the formal dinner, writes in his note, “If 
Jews were treated like cattle, it does not follow that cattle are treated like Jews. The 
inversion insults the memory of the dead. It also trades on the horrors of the camps in 
a cheap way” (94). Stern here overlooks Costello’s attempt to put what he calls “the 
familiar comparison” (94) into a new context and to look past the emotionally charged 
events into their causes. He is right, however, in pointing out the “cheap way” in which 
Elizabeth as well as other, non-fictional writers and activists use the comparison to 
pursue their goals, however honorable they may be. Although Costello is trying to 
appeal to a more profound similarity than one in which Jews become animals and vice 
versa, this surface level is still the one that, to her audience, remains most visible, most 
familiar, and therefore most clearly understood. She is well aware of this, as shown in 
her comment following the Holocaust-related part of her talk: “Pardon me, I repeat. 
That is the last cheap point I will be scoring. I know how talk of this kind polarizes 
people, and cheap point-scoring only makes it worse” (66). This point is striking in 
that Costello acknowledges the comparison is likely to be a failure rhetorically, but 
chooses to make it nonetheless. This is counterproductive and Costello does so only 
due to her own failure to practice sympathetic imagination. The idea that sympathetic 
imagination is required not only with animals but also with humans in order to achieve 
communion and communication, although present in the book, never becomes part of 
Costello’s discourse. Indeed, the text suggests Elizabeth’s failure to realize that our 
communion with other people is also to a large extent a matter of imagination. It is 
exactly her tendency to take communion with other people for granted that makes 
Costello such a tragic character; it is also with respect to this problem that the 
difference between Coetzee and Costello becomes most pronounced. Not only does 
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Coetzee repeatedly place his protagonist in situations where she is misunderstood but 
he also stresses her own inability to understand, an inability which brings her much 
pain, as is most evident in the moment of her breakdown at the end of the fourth lesson: 
I seem to move around perfectly easily among people, to have perfectly normal 
relations with them. Is it possible, I ask myself, that all of them are participants in a 
crime of stupefying proportions? Am I fantasizing it all? I must be mad! Yet every 
day I see the evidences. The very people I suspect produce the evidence, exhibit it, 
offer it to me. Corpses. Fragments of corpses that they have bought for money. […]  
I look into your eyes, into Norma’s, into the children’s, and I see only 
kindness, human-kindness. Calm down, I tell myself, you are making a mountain out 
of a molehill. This is life. Everyone else comes to terms with it, why can’t you? Why 
can’t you? (114-115) 
 
However, Elizabeth’s failure is not in her inability to ignore animal suffering. Rather, 
she is wrong to expect a perfect understanding between herself and her family. In 
portraying Elizabeth’s visit as full of confusion, misjudgment and misconception, 
Coetzee recalls  Derrida writing in The Beast and the Sovereign:  
 
Every day, at every moment of the day and night, we are overcome with the feeling 
that between a given other, and sometimes the closest of those close to us and of those 
we so imprudently and stupidly, tenderly and violently, our own, and ourselves – those 
with whom we share everything […] the feeling that the worlds in which we live are 
different to the point of the monstrosity of the unrecognizable, of the un-similar, of 
the unbelievable, of the nonsimilar, the non-resembling or the resemblable, the non-
assimilable […] the abyssal unshareable.44  
 
In other words, Coetzee’s text reminds its readers that while communion with animals 
and the inclusion of animals within the field of ethical consideration is a relatively new 
task, one has no right to forget that it is only by upholding imaginative communion 
with other people that this task can be carried out. This imaginative communion is not 
something we are born to as members of the same species; instead, it is a matter of 
constant effort and negotiation. This effort is bound to be endless, as every conclusion 
would bring with itself a new set of exclusive binaries. Thus on this level too the novel 
promotes uncertainty over certainty; movement over fixedness. Rejection of the thesis 
that understanding between humans, unlike understanding between humans and 
                                                 
44 Jacques Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume II, Eds. M. Lisse, M. Mallet, G. Michaud, 
translated by G Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011) 266.  
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animals, is easily achievable, forms the basis of the new post-humanist concept of 
responsibility introduced in the novel. 
This in turn is based on the idea that responsibility cannot be enclosed by any borders. 
When Costello says that “there are no bounds to the sympathetic imagination” (80), 
she implies that every limit such an imagination can meet is a construct. Indeed, during 
the dinner at the Faculty Club following her talk, the guests attempt to “define our 
difference from animals in general” (86) and therefore to establish what it is exactly 
that makes the sacrifice of animal life acceptable (since as Derrida notes, “who can be 
made to believe that our cultures are carnivorous because animal proteins are 
irreplaceable”).45 The answer is never established. Instead, the conversation is 
interrupted by a remark from president Garrard that can be interpreted as passive-
aggressive, but which simultaneously exposes the extent to which our language is also 
predicated upon the sacrificial order: “A wonderful lecture, Mrs. Costello. [...] Much 
food for thought. We look forward to tomorrow’s offering” (90).46  
However, it would be a mistake to think that Costello’s refusal to establish a border 
line between the human and the animal advocates ignoring the differences to agree on 
a homogeneity: “The question to ask should not be: Do we have something in common 
[…] with other animals?” (79). Rather, her argument is closer to Derrida’s in “The 
Animal That Therefore I Am”:  
This does not of course mean ignoring or effacing everything that separates 
humankind from the other animals, creating a single large set, a single great, 
fundamentally homogeneous and continuous family tree... [...] I repeat that it is rather 
a matter of taking into account a multiplicity of heterogeneous structures and limits. 
Among nonhumans and separate from nonhumans there is an immense multiplicity of 
other living things that cannot in any way be homogenized, except by means of 
violence and willful ignorance, within the category of what is called the animal or 
animality in general.47 
 
                                                 
45 Derrida, “Eating Well,” 112.   
46 Apart from the illusive nature of justification behind the social practice of meat eating, the scene 
with the dinner also demonstrates that the very questioning of this justification is usually attempted 
during meal times, simultaneously with the eating of flesh. Moreover, for such a conversation to 
even take place, a vegetarian needs to be present at a table, otherwise the question is rarely asked 
and the sacrificial order is taken for granted. 
47 Derrida, Jacques.  “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow).” Trans. David Wills. Critical 
Inquiry Vol. 28, 2002: 416.  
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For Costello, sympathetic imagination becomes the means to access this immense 
multiplicity and consequently to replace a single overbearing limit with countless and 
constantly proliferating differences. This is complicated further by Coetzee’s refusal 
to agree that any kind of homogeneity exists between humans. Consequently, any 
being, human or non-human, becomes impossible to exclude from ethical and moral 
consideration. While the implications of this argument appear to be overwhelming, 
inflating responsibility to the extent that any action becomes potentially harming and 
irresponsible, it in fact merely repeats Derrida’s idea that “responsibility is excessive 
or it is not a responsibility.”48 In other words, every system that seeks to impose a 
definite limit on responsibility, that empowers “the good conscience that dogmatically 
stops before any inherited determination of justice,”49 and that looks for final solutions 
to the problem of responsibility, is a system driven by the dangerous logic of division. 
A symbolic economy in which we can engage in a “noncriminal putting to death” of 
all those who fall on the other side of the limit is thus potentiated.50 The text suggests 
that this can happen and has happened to animal as well as human others, and that 
responsibility emerges not through the drawing of exclusionary borders, but through a 
never-ending effort that takes nothing for granted and makes potentially harmful but 
conscious choices. Systems that allow for a realm beyond responsibility create a 
dangerous space to which anyone can be banished. It is by and within these systems 
that massacres not only occur, but occur while everyone watches but nobody notices. 
 
                                                 
48 Derrida, “Eating Well,” 118.  
49 Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: 'The Mystical Foundation of Authority'”, Deconstruction and the 
Possibility of Justice. Ed. Drucilla Cornell and Michael Rosenfeld (New York: Routlege, 1992) 248. 
50 Cary Wolfe, Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003) 6. 
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7.  Conclusion  
This project followed, analyzed and explicated various fictional “animots”, 
with the ambitious goal of demonstrating that nearly everything we know about the 
beings we choose to call animals amounts to fiction. Be it the arguable ‘fiction’ of 
science, history, philosophy, or literature proper, the animals that populate these 
discourses have been conceptualized by humans and for humans. Furthermore, it is on 
this “beastly” foundation that we have built the notion of what constitutes ourselves; 
the human “us”.  
In these chapters, literary texts that resist the dominant discourse on animality 
were analyzed against a background of contemporary philosophy harboring the same 
ambition. As a result, the thesis has presented an intricate picture within which the 
concept of animality was challenged from various perspectives and developed in 
unexpected directions. In the first chapter I read “Calypso”, the 4th episode of Ulysses, 
where Leopold Bloom eats “with relish the inner organs of beasts and fowls”1 while 
simultaneously fondling and talking to his cat, through the notion of “moral 
schizophrenia,”2 which allowed me to expose the contradiction between the loving and 
caring relationships people establish with their pets and the tendency to ignore the 
moral and ethical issues connected with the exploitation of other categories of animals, 
especially those within the meat industry. The problem of eating animals also 
constitutes the basis for my analysis of “Lestrygonians” where the line separating 
murder from sacrifice becomes blurred, thereupon obscuring the animal-human divide 
dependent on it. In the episode where it is not clear who eats whom and where 
cannibalistic imagery proliferates, the eating of any flesh becomes problematic. This 
theme returns in my analysis of Elizabeth Costello where the “willed ignorance”3 
surrounding the intensive animal farming industry is connected to a certain limit to 
“sympathetic imagination”, a constructed border beyond which sympathy dares not 
venture. This border is enforced by the concept of limited responsibility and gives rise 
                                                 
1 James Joyce, Ulysses. Ed. Hans Walter Gabler (New York: Garland, 1984) 4.1-5. 
2 Gary Steiner, Animals and the Limits of Postmodernism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2013) 155. 
3 J.M. Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello: Eight Lessons (London, Vintage Books, 2004) 64. 
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to a symbolic economy within which humans can engage in a “noncriminal putting to 
death”4 of all those, human or non-human, who fall on the “wrong” side of it. In the 
novel, the idea of limited responsibility is rejected. Instead Elizabeth Costello 
envisages what Derrida understands as “excessive responsibility” that emerges not 
through drawing exclusionary borders but as a never-ending effort that takes nothing 
for granted to make potentially harmful but conscious choices. 
Another set of ethical issues connected to animality emerges in Brophy’s 
Hackenfeller’s Ape. I argue that the novel constitutes a critique of the scientific or 
“sadodispassionate”5 approach to nature, which erases any possibility of empathy or 
identification with the animal. Deeming any emotional engagement with animals to be 
sentimental and unreasonable, this approach denies their emotional lives and the 
capacity to suffer. The underlying goal of this discourse is to establish the human as 
the position of power and mastery, while rendering the animal to be an appropriate 
object of exploitation. The novel reveals that “the animal” is by no means a descriptive 
term, but rather a political one and as such it is not meant to describe what the animal 
is, but only what can be done to it.  
Flush and Nightwood, on the other hand, are narratives in which the 
reinvention of the animal is contingent upon reinventing the human. In Flush, Virginia 
Woolf repudiates the metaphysical tradition that perceives animality according to 
notions of lack and impoverishment rendering animal experience to be less complex 
than that of the human. Woolf juxtaposes Flush’s olfactory explorations with Robert 
and Elizabeth Browning’s writing in seclusion to expose language, the ultimate human 
privilege, as an affliction and something that stands in the way of an unmediated 
experience of the world. My reading of the novel concludes with the claim that Flush 
carries an anti-fascist message. It exposes human society as contaminated by countless 
forms of oppression on both micro- (family) and macro- (political) levels, implying 
that it is through interaction with animality and, therefore, through rethinking the very 
opposition between the human and the animal, that the vicious circle of oppression can 
                                                 
4 Jacques Derrida, “’Eating Well,’ or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jacques 
Derrida,” Who Comes after the Subject? Ed. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, Jean-Luc Nancy (New 
York; London: Routledge, 1991) 112. 
5 Teresa Brennan, History after Lacan (London: Routledge, 2003) 72. 
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be broken. Nightwood constitutes a similar undertaking, attempting to provide a new 
system of coordinates by which humanity can navigate itself, and sees the animal as 
possibly its agent od discovery. The text envisages a new type of posthumanist 
subjectivity that rejects stability and moves swiftly between the animal and the human, 
ultimately exposing this binary to be untenable.  
Another issue that assumed increasing importance in the course of this project 
is the problem of animal representation. Already in the first chapter I read “Cyclops” 
as an episode that satirizes the literary approach that reduces animals to metaphors for 
the human. I proceed to consider the use of anthropomorphism in Flush and 
Hackenfeller’s Ape, arguing that while the former interprets it as a means to establish 
an emotional and imaginary connection with an animal by focusing on our similarities 
rather than differences, the latter does not see it as an appropriate tool to explore 
animality, criticizing it instead as an anthropocentric and reductive strategy. Finally, I 
read Elizabeth Costello as a text in which the problem of animal representation takes 
center-stage. Here the idea of the human merging with the animal resurfaces and is 
linked to the concept of “sympathetic imagination.”6 This concept, which I read 
through Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of “becoming”, puts the animal presence at the 
intersection of the reading and writing processes. While affirming the possibility of 
animal representation as such, I highlight its incompatibility with the notion of 
literature as a controlled event emerging from the attempts of a self-present subject.  
I see the problem of animal representation, which this project considers 
carefully but necessarily never fully resolves, as crucial to the development of the field 
of Animal Studies. It is only through the writing of new animal fictions that the limits 
of ethical responsibility can be challenged. The strange animals that will populate 
those new fictions might allow humans to reconceptualize themselves as something 
new, as something post-; however, for humans in the present moment the advances 
within Animal Studies may mean little more than becoming what we have always 
already imagined ourselves to be, becoming human. Since as long as there remains an 
enclosure within moral responsibility with walls so high the kindness of the kindest 
cannot leap them; an enclosure into which profoundly different beings are pushed to 
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face undeserved suffering whose intensity, if considered, baffles imagination; as long 
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